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I. Introduction
This working paper is the first in a series of working papers
by this author that will contain the preliminary findings of
a two-year research project on the microeconomic effects of
direct foreign investment (DFI) on the development of Turkish
manufacturing.
The forthcoming working papers will discuss the preliminary
research results on ownership structure and control, financial
structure, sales, production costs, employment, capacity utilization,
technology, imports and import substitution, exports and export
promotion of DFI firms in Turkish manufacturing.
These working papers, although initially self-contained and
independent of each other, will later be published together, in
their revised versions, as a book. Consequently, the joint analysis
and integration of the project's full set of findings will not be
attempted in the individual working papers.
The author is Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Case
Western Reserve University. - This project was financed by the
Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and the Kiel Institute of World
Economics, the Federal Republic of Germany, while the author was an
Alexander von Humboldt fellow at the Kiel Institute during 1977-79.- 2 -
II. Direct Foreign Investment Process and Climate
The direct foreign investment (DFI) process refers collectively
to the initiation and formalization of the DFI idea, the application
to and negotiations with the host-country government for DFI
authorization, the implementation of the DFI project, and its
actual private profitability relative to the initial and present
expectations of the investors.
The DFI process is, of course, a complex one involving economic,
political and social factors, as it takes place in the host country's
DFI climate that is itself shaped by those factors. Understanding
the evolution of the host-country's DFI climate is essential to the
analysis of the DFI process. Therefore, our analysis of the DFI
process in Turkish manufacturing will frequently refer to the salient
aspects of the past and present DFI climate in Turkey. No effort
will be made here, however, to present a complete and systematic
discussion of the DFI climate in Turkey.
Throughout the analysis of our quantitative findings, we will
frequently refer to the results of our interviews with the executives
of DFI firms and Turkish government officials. Our objective in doing
so will be both to compare the questionnaire results with those of
the interviews and to clarify the former in terms of the latter.
On the whole, the interview results show that there was an
adversary relationship between DFI firms and the Turkish government.
The former accused the latter of hostility toward DFI, reflected in
deliberately obstructionist and blatantly discriminatory policies
that were claimed to be often in violation of Turkish laws. The latter,
on the other hand, accused the former of bad faith, paranoia, and
deceptive, even criminal, behaviour in their activities, which had to
be brought under more effective control by stricter regulations.- 3 -
Neither side trusted the other to any degree. Each side traced
its problems to the other side's attempt to realize unfair and/or
illegal gains at its expense. In other words, both sides appeared
to view DFI activity in Turkish manufacturing as a zero-sum game.
Furthermore, each side accused the other of breaking the rules of
the game, that is, cheating. In fact, through their mutual accusa-
tions and reciprocal violations of the rules of the game, both sides
seemed to have converted DFI into a negative-sum game.
Now, the results of the interviews with DFI firms, when
considered in conjunction with their questionnaire responses as
well as the results of the interviews x^ith government officials,
indicate the following: DFI firms, despite their either justified
or unjustified complaints against the government, were actually
quite successful in adapting to the unfavorable if not hostile
DFI climate in Turkey. Their adaptation was evidenced repeatedly,
leaving no doubt in our mind that they were far from helpless in
finding ways to neutralize the government's discriminatory,
obstructionist and often contradictory DFI policies. Their adapta-
tion was undoubtedly made easier by the fact that their most serious
and justified complaint against the Turkish government was the same
one that all private firms had against the government: Short-sighted,
incoherent, unpredictable and excessive direct government inter-
vention on both the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels. Moreover,
such ambitious government intervention, aimed at directing all
economic activity at all levels was not all that effective. The
government was simply incapable of realizing its interventionist
aims, lacking the resources required to enforce the implementation
of its directives.
The government did succeed, however, in pushing the DFI and all-
Turkish firms into illegal, short-sighted and inefficient ways of
doing business, which it then took as evidence for the crookedness of- 4 -
the private business sector, and as justification for yet
stricter and more sweeping direct intervention. In short, there
was evidently a vicious circle between direct government inter-
vention and business adaptation to it that drove both sides
toward increasingly extreme and desperate moves to come out
on top. Well, the business sector came out on top more often
than the government. However, during this process, as it involved
DFI activity specifically, the DFI firms and the government both
contributed to converting DFI into a negative-sum game. The ultimate
losers were obviously neither the DFI firms nor the government,
that is, politicians and bureaucrats themselves, but the Turkish
manufacturing sector and the national economy as a whole. In other
words, the feud between the DFI firms and the government retarded
the development of Turkish manufacturing and thereby reduced
national economic welfare. DFI can be, of course, a cooperative,
positive-sum game if the foreign investors and the host-country
government are able to deal with each other on the basis of a
minimum level of mutual trust after agreeing on and then obeying
the rules of the game. This was not, however, the case with DFI
in Turkish manufacturing.
III. The Institutional Framework for Regulation of DFI in Turkish
Manufacturing under Law 6224
Despite the Turkish government's persistent attempts to direct
all activities of DFI firms on a firm-specific level, there was no
one single specialized agency with adequate authority and resources
that could spearhead such attempts. On the contrary, governmental
authority was split haphazardly among mainly the Ministry of Commerce
(MOC), the State Planning Organization (SPO), the Ministry of Finance
(MOF), and the Ministry of Industry and Technology. There was no
effective cooperation and coordination among them. In fact, they
were often at odds with each other thanks to their political and
bureaucratic rivalries that made it impossible for them to form a
united front against DFI firms.- 5 -
Therefore, when we referred previously to "the government" as the
adversary of DFI firms, we overlooked the fact it had deprived
itself of a unified and sharply focused authority in regulating
them. This was clearly the other very important reason why DFI
firms were able to neutralize its discriminatory, obstructionist
and often contradictory DFI policies. Those policies could not
be adequately implemented by different government agencies
working frequently at cross-purposes and almost never together.
These agencies although acting separately were successful, never-
theless, in forcing DFI firms to resort often to illegal and
inefficient business practices. They were not very successful,
however, by their own admission in coping with such practices
which the DFI firms appeared to have developed for survival. Ironically,
some of those practices such as transfer-pricing might have well
enabled several foreign investors to increase the net benefits
from their Turkish ventures above the levels that they would have
obtained otherwise. /.
We now review briefly the official procedures that investors had
to follow in establishing a DFI firm in Turkish manufacturing under
Law 6224.
1) DFI application was submitted to the Ministry of Commerce (MOC).
2) The MOC reviewed the application, checking its informational
content and completeness.
3) If the application was in compliance with its requirements, the
MOC sent the application to the State Planning Organization (SPO).
4) The SPO evaluated the net economic and technological benefits to
Turkey of the proposed project, within the framework of the
current National Five-Year Development Plan.
5) If the SPO's evaluation was favourable, the application received
bureaucratic (as opposed to political) conditional approval. The
SPO's approval was conditional on the investors' acceptance of
certain commitments and requirements that were written into a
draft decree by the SPO. If its evaluation was unfavourable, the
SPO prepared a report explaining its reasons.- 6 -
6) The SPO sent its decision to the MOC. The MOC then informed
the investors of the SPO's decision, forwarding them the
draft decree in case of a favourable decision.
7) The investors could appeal an unfavourable decision to the
High Planning Council, a body of cabinet ministers and
high-level bureaucrats with responsibilities in economic
matters. In case of a favourable decision, the investors
could either accept their draft decree as it was or ask that
certain changes be made in it to their advantage. In case of
the latter, they would be bargaining with the SPO for a revision
of their draft decree, the MOC acting as the intermediary
between them.
8) Either the. original or revised draft decree after its acceptance
by the investors was sent by the MOC to the Council of Ministers
(COM) for political approval. The COM's approval had to be un-
animous. In other words, the draft decree had to be signed by
all cabinet ministers before it could become the final decree.
The final decree went into effect, acquiring the force of law,
with its publication in the Official Gazette.
Before it could be officially established, however, following the
publication of its final decree, a DFI firm had to comply with all
the relevant provisions of the Turkish Commercial Code. This could
take some time. Furthermore, a DFI firm had to wait until the
publication of its final decree before it could apply to the Ministry
of Finance for approval on foreign equity and credit transfer to
Turkey, and to the Ministry of Industry and Technology for receiving
industrial investment incentives in the implementation of the project
described in its final decree.
After a new DFI firm was established on the basis of a founding decree
or an existing one was permitted to grow on the basis of an
expansion decree, there was little systematic, coordinated and effec-
tive government regulation to ensure that the firm complied with all
the conditions of its decree. Such a regulatory task was not owned- 7 -
up to by any of the government agencies mentioned earlier.
First, no agency had a clear-cut statutory authority to serve
in that role. The Ministry of Commerce seemed to be closest to
possessing that authority but was unwilling to claim it. Second,
no agency had the capability to fulfill that role even if it
were to have the statutory authority, as the author was told
by the agencies concerned themselves.
In short, the government, behaving paradoxically, tried to direct
all DFI activities on a firm-specific basis, often throwing the
DFI firms into a maze of often conflicting, inconsistent and un-
realistic regulations, but failed to establish an effective regu-
latory system for enforcing those regulations. Obviously, such
regulations could be effectively enforced only at the expense of
wiping out, if not all, almost all DFI activity from Turkish
manufacturing. Even not effectively enforced, however, those
regulations were quite harmful to the interests of foreign investors
but more so to the interests of Turkey. They helped create a DFI
environment of mutual antagonism and distrust whose levels went
far beyond the normal levels found in many other host-countries.
IV. Data and Methodology
There are no published DFI statistics in Turkey. The Turkish
government collects but does not publish any DFI data. Although
the author was able to gain access to some of Turkish government's
DFI data, they were not used in arriving at the findings reported
here, unless indicated otherwise.- 8 -
The DFI firm-specific confidential data of this study were
botained by the author himself from the individual firms directly
through extensive interviews and also a questionnaire, designed by
the author specifically for this study. Interviews were also con-
ducted with prominent Turkish businessmen as well as Turkish
government officials who were directly concerned with DFI activities
in Turkish manufacturing. All interviews were conducted by the
author himself, who spent a total of nine months in Turkey to collect
the data used in this study.
All firms and individuals were promised strict confidentiality
concerning their identity and participation in this study. Conse-
quently, the names of firms or individuals who cooperated with the
author cannot be revealed. As might be expected, not all firms and
individuals whose cooperation was sought were willing to cooperate,
especially in completing the questionnaire, despite the author's
promise of strict confidentiality. Several firms that consented to
be interviewed, refused, either at the outset or later, to complete
the questionnaire for different reasons.
The author attempted to include in his sample all but the relatively
very small DFI firms that were covered by Law 6224 for the En-
couragement of Foreign Investment and engaged in manufacturing
operations. According to Turkish government statistics, at the end
of 1977, there were 86 manufacturing DFI firms. The author's
initial investigation in the field revealed, however, that only 73
of them were either already or still active DFI firms. Some of them
had not yet initiated production and the rest were no longer DFI firms,
since their foreign equity shares had been sold to Turkish nationals.
Of the 73 active DFI firms, 62 were chosen (according to their total
size and/or foreign equity share) for investigation.
Of these, 6 refused any cooperation and 10 consented to be inter-
viewed but, either initially or later, refused to complete the
questionnaire. So, 46 of the 62 DFI firms that were approached
participated in the study in both ways, by giving interviews and
returning a partially or fully completed questionnaire._ Q _
The sample included only DFI manufacturing firms. Although
the author realized that it would be highly desirable to work
with a bifurcated sample of DFI and national manufacturing firms
in order to conduct a comparative analysis according to ownership
and/or control characteristics, he decided to concentrate instead
on DFI firms only and maximize their coverage subject to his
research resource constraints. Some of the questions raised by
this study about the behaviour of DFI firms can be answered,
however, only by a future comparative investigation of DFI and
national firms, based on a bifurcated sample.
The 46 firms with questionnaire data have been classified into
nine sectors by the author:
1. Food and beverages (3 firms)
2. Rubber (3 firms)
3. Chemicals (8 firms)
4. Pharmaceuticals (5 firms)
5. Transportation Vehicles and Tractors (7 firms)
6. Non-electrical Machinery and Metal Products (5 firms)
7. Electrical Cables (3 firms)
8. Electrical Machinery and Electronics (10 firms)
9. Building Materials (2 firms)
This classification scheme differs from the Turkish government's
own scheme of fifteen manufacturing sectors, used in compiling
official (unpublished and confidential) DFI data. Except for sectors- 10 -
1 and 2 above, the two schemes are not comparable. Our
classification scheme was devised after the data collection
on the basis of the coverage of our 46 firm sample.
The empirical findings of this paper are first presented for
manufacturing as a whole, consisting of all the 46 DFI firms in
our sample, and then the sectoral findings are selectively
discussed in order to elucidate the aggregate findings. A complete
and systematic analysis of the sectoral findings themselves will
be attempted later on in individual sectoral studies, incorporating
all other aspects of LFI besides the DFI process which is focused
on here. As regards the intersectoral comparisons of our empirical
findings, it should be kept in mind that they have different
relative levels of statistical reliability because of the different
numbers of respondents in individual sectors.
The questionnaire data were processed and all the computations
were performed by using the Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences (SPSS) on the Harris System at Case Western Reserve
University. The author acknowledges the valuable assistance of
Mr. Adil Talaysum, a Ph. D. candidate in economics at CWRU,
in data processing.- 11 -
V. Empirical Findings
1. Initiator of the :

















































The figures above corroborate the conclusion that had been reached
on the basis of the DFI firm interviews that in most cases the DFI
idea was initiated and promoted by Turkish interests. In almost all
of these cases, the Turkish partners were previous importers and
distributors of the parent firms! products. Turkey's import-substi-
tution-oriented industrialization drive and recurrent balance of
payments crises that restricted imports of manufactured products
either motivated or forced them to become domestic producers of
such products. Since they frequently lacked the patents and/or
know-how required for all-Turkish ventures and also wished to
share the financial risks with foreign interests, they approached
the foreign firms, whose products they distributed and thus were
most familiar with, to start joint-ventures in Turkey.- 12 -
This pattern is also explained by the fact that Turkish govern-
ments have either willingly or unwillingly failed to make
Turkey an attractive host-country for DFI. Especially for export-
oriented DFI seeking relatively low unit costs of a disciplined
labor-force denied the right to strike, as in South Korea and
Taiwan, Turkey has been totally unattractive. It is especially
this type of DFI that is, in general, initiated by the parent firms
themselves, as opposed to DFI that is local market-oriented in
a country such as Turkey with at best a lukewarm official
attitude toward any type of DFI.
During the interviews with DFI firms, several Turkish as well as
foreign executives underlined their parent firms' initial reluctance
to commit themselves to investing in Turkey after being approached
by their Turkish partners. Some of these executives described their
parent firms' initial as well as present view of their DFI experience
in Turkey in terms of their "Turkish adventure", stressing the
relatively high degree of risk they associated with their ventures.
Against this background, however, still almost 40 percent of the
respondents identified their parent firm as the DFI idea initiator.
Therefore, it would be misleading to over-generalize and create
the impression that sceptical and unwilling parent firms had to be
more or less dragged into their Turkish (ad)ventures by their local
partners. Some foreign firms, especially European ones, had been
determined to invest in Turkey without any prodding from anyone
and were still committed to a long-run presence in Turkey against
all odds.
Now let us look at the sectoral pattern of the role of the parent
firm as the DFI idea initiator:-1
- 13 -
Table 2 - Parent Firm as the DFI Idea Initiator
Sector Parent Firm as the DFI Idea
Initiator - Adjusted Frequency (%)




5. Transportation Vehicles and 33.3
Tractors
6. Non-electrical Machinery 80.0
and Metal Products
7. Electrical Cables 50.0
8. Electrical Machinery 30.0
and Electronics
9. Building Materials 100.0
What we find is that only in sectors 5 and 8 was the parent firm
relatively unimportant as the DFI idea initiator. Interestingly,
these two sectors together accounted for about 40 % of all DFI assets
under Law 6224 during 1976-78, having increased their shares rapidly
since the late 196O's. Therefore, it may be concluded that during the
last decade, which witnessed the concentration of new DFI activity
in the Turkish automotive and electrical consumer durable sectors,
coupled with the toughening of Turkish DFI policies, the role2 of the
parent firm as the DFI idea initiator declined considerably.- 14 -
2. Formalizer of the DFI Idea








Absolute Relative Adjusted Cumulative





























Total 46 100.0 100.0
Formalization of the DFI idea refers to its quantitative analysis
through a project appraisal. Not surprisingly a significant majority,
about 68 percent, of the respondents listed their parent firm as the
DFI idea fornalizer.
Table 4 - Parent Firm as the DFI Idea Formalizer
Sector Parent Firm as the Formalizer of the
DFI Idea - Adjusted Frequency (%)




5. Transportation Vehicles and
Tractors








Sector Parent Firm as the Formalizer of the
DFI Idea - Adjusted Frequency (%)
7. Electrical Cables 100.0
8. Electrical Machinery and 30.0
Electronics
9. Building Materials 100.0
We observe that in sectors 6 and 8 the role of the parent firm as
the formalizer of the DFI idea was substantially less significant
thaa in the others. We might expect this role to increase with the
technological and financial complexity of the DFI project as well
as the size of the foreign equity share. In the present case, the
latter explanation appears to be more plausible.
In sector 6, although 80 percent of the respondents identified the
parent firm as the DFI idea initiator, only 20 percent identified
it as the idea formalizer. In sector 8, however, the corresponding
figures were the same, and relatively low, at 30 percent. On the
other hand, in sector 5, although cnly about 33 percent of the
respondents identified the parent firm as the DFI idea initiator,
60 percent identified it as the DFI idea formalizer. These marked
sectoral differences in the relative roles of the parent firm in
DFI idea initiation and formalization will be investigated in a
later stage of our work.
3. Investmend Decision-Application Lag
Mean =5.9 months (m) Standard Deviation = 9.1 m
Standard Error = 2.1 m
Minimum = - 12.0 m Maximum = 21.0 m
Valid Observations = 19 Missing Observations = 27
There was an average lag of almost 6 months between the final DFI
decision and the formal application to the Turkish government for
authorization. Interestingly, 4 of the 19 firms, for which this
statistic could be computed, showed negative values, ranging between
- 12 and - 1 months. This may be interpreted in terms of either the- 16 -
investors' uncertainty about the outcome of the bargaining
with the Turkish government on the terms of their DFI authorization
decrees or their preemptive moves to position themselves in
the Turkish market in anticipation of rival DFI applications.
Until recently the DFI authorization decrees did not contain
a time limit for their implementation, enabling their holders
to keep their DFI options indefinitely while precluding at least
some rival DFI ventures. This is no longer entirely possible as all
DFI authorization decrees now specify that authorized investments
must be made within specific time periods. Unimplemented decrees
are cancelled by the Turkish government.
Table 5 - Sectoral Investment Decision - Application Lags
Sector Investment Decision - Application Lag
Sectoral Mean (months)




5. Transportation Vehicles 2.7
and Tractors
6. Non-electrical Machinery 20.0
and Metal Products
7. Electrical Cables 6.0
8. Electrical Machinery 5.4
and Electronics
9. Building Materials 12.0- 17 -
There is clearly considerable variation among sectors. In terms
of the changing sectoral pattern of DFI concentration over time,
however, this lag appears to have declined substantially. It
should also be noted that the timing of a DFI application after
the investment decision has been made, is significantly influenced
by the expected changes in the host country's political and
economic conditions in the short-run. During the intervievs with
the existing DEI firms, the author was told by several executives
that although they had decided to seek authorization for either
new or expansion projects, they were forced by Turkey's deteriorating
political stability and still unsettled international bankruptcy
to postpone application. They emphasized that a new strong govern-
ment and restoration of Turkey's international creditworthiness
were the necessary conditions for them to initiate formal DFI
applications. We would expect this to be true for most potential,
i.e. not yet formed CFI firms as well.
4. Were Changes Demanded by the Turkish Government in the DFI
Project Proposal?



























Total 46 100.0 100.0- 18 -
Slightly more than one half the respondents indicated that their
proposals were accepted by the Turkish government without any
changes. During the interviews with DFI firms, we discovered,
however, that it was no longer expected to have any DFI application
approved by the government without making some changes in the
application. Most firms regarded the government's demands for such
changes as unrealistic and unreasonable.
Table 7 - Changes Were Demanded by the Government
Sector Changes *?ere Demanded by the Turkish
Government - Adjusted Frequency (%)




5. Transportation Vehicles 83.3
and Tractors
6. Non-electrical Machinery and 20.0
Metal Products
7. Electrical Cables 33.3
8. Electrical Machinery and 70.0
Electronics
9. Building Materials 50.0
Sectors 5 and 8, in which the role of the parent of firm as the
DFI initiator was seen to be the least significant among all sectors,
are also the two sectors in which changes in the- DFI project proposals
were most frequently demanded by the Turkish government. These are
the two sectors that accounted for the most rapid DFI increases after
the late 1960's, which also witnessed the toughening of Turkish DFI
policies. These policies became increasingly more demanding of new
DFI projects, especially in terms of minimum export and local-content- 19 -
requirements. This conclusion is also strongly supported by
the author's comparative analysis of DFI authorization decrees
for more than 100 firms, issued since the early 1950's. The
decrees issued in the 1970's contain several specific conditions
and requirements that had to be met by DFI firms, whereas those
issued in the 196O's and especially the 1950's contain very few
or none.
5. Changes remanded by the Turkish Government in the DFI
Project Proposals.






Changes in product specification
Changes in financing
Changes to joint-venture














































25.0Table g _ Changes Demanded by the Turkish Government: in Che Ol'l













































































































































0.0 0.0 33.0 0.0 40.0 100.0 0.0 14.3 0.0
1. Food and beverages 2. Rubber 3. Chemicals 4. Pharmaceuticals 5. Transportation vehicles and tractors
6. Non-electrical machinery 7. Electrical cables 8. Electrical machinery and electronics 9. Building
materials . '- 21 -
The most frequently demanded change appears to have been in the
financing of the DFI projects, followed by increases in export-
commitment and in local content. Financing changes were often
in terms of the Turkish government's insistence that the DFI pro-
jects reduce their dependence on domestic credits. Both the export-
commitment and the increasing local-content considerations have
become paramount recently in the Turkish government's review of
new and also existing DFI projects. Most of the DFI firms inter-
viewed complained that the Turkish government had become too rigid
and unreasonable in its demands on these two issues. These complaints
and the responses of government officials will be examined in some
detain after reviewing the sectoral differences in the changes
most frequently demanded by the Turkish government.
Not surprisingly, the two sectors with the largest number of changes
demanded are sectors 5 and 8. In sector 5, changes in financing
and increases in local-content were demanded with the highest and
equal frequency. In sector 8, however, changes in financing were
most frequently demanded, followed by increases in export-commitment
and increase in local-content with the next highest and equal frequency,
During the interviews conducted with DFI firm executives, the
Turkish government's demands for increases in export-commitments and
increases in local-content were criticized more frequently and
harshly than its restrictions on the local credits available to DFI
firms. In fact, the government's pressure on those existing DFI firms
with majority foreign ownership to reduce their foreign ownership
was complained about more bitterly than the restrictions on local
financing.
What has to be kept in mind here is the important distinction
between the process of all-new DFI authorized by the founding decree
of a DFI firm and the process of expansion or modernization DFI
authorized by the post-founding decrees. Unfortunately, however,- 22 -
the questionnaire results could not make this distinction
sufficiently clear by themselves. Consequently, their inter-
pretation requires reliance on the interview results. So, we
now turn to the latter, beginning with the complaints of DFI
firms about the increasing local-content requirements and export-
commitments.
A. The Controversy on Local-Contents and Exports
Especially the DFI firms officially classified as Assembly
Industry firms and, thereby, subjected to the special regu-
lations, administered by the Ministry of Industry and Technology,
concerning increasing local-content, claimed that the government
pursued contradictory policies toward them. Either by their
decrees or by the annual sectoral Assembly Industry regulations,
these firms were required to increase their local-contents year
after year and on a product by product basis. Their annual import
licenses for CKD (completely knocked down) components and
other imported intermediate inputs were made conditional on
meeting the increasing local-content requirements imposed on
them. In fact, each year every Assembly Industry firm was told
by the government which components it could import and which
components it had to obtain locally. It could either begin to
produce itself the components whose importation was prohibited or
purchase them from other local producers if there were any.
The Assembly Industry Code, enacted in 1964 and since then periodically
revised, was aimed at expediting the development of the "screw-driver"
industries, resulting from Turkey's ambitious import-substitution drive
for industrialization, into genuine national industries with high
local-content. The Code covered both DFI and all-Turkish manufacturing
firms. The most important of the assembly industries was the automotive
sector.- 23 -
The DFI firms that had to comply with increasing local-
content requirements voiced the following complaints:
(1) The annual local-content requirements were formulated
too ambitiously, without due regard for their cost-in-
creasing and quality-decreasing effects. The single-
mindedness of the government to increase local-contents
across the board in manufacturing was singularly at odds
with efficiency and quality.
(2) Many DFI firms had to increase their physical capacities,
i.e. purchase fixed assets for expansion, in order to comply
with their increasing local-content requirements, but faced
serious difficulties in obtaining expansion decrees from
the government. They could not easily meet their requirements
by purchasing locally the components previously imported,
since local suppliers were either non-existent or unreliable
to fulfill orders with the speed, cost-effectiveness and
engineering-tolerance needed.
(3) Many DFI firms had official export-commitments, as minimum
physical or monetary export quotas, written into their decrees.
It became harder to meet these commitments as the local-content
requirements increased. These requirements eroded further
the already weak international competitiveness of Turkish
manufacturing, in terms of both higher unit costs and poorer
quality. The government either failed to realize or chose
to ignore the fact that successful export performance was
incompatible with local-content maximization.
(4) Furthermore, the government prohibited the DFI firms that
had export commitments in their decrees to export whenever
serious domestic supply shortages developed. The government's
short-term political justification for such a ban on exports
was well-understood. It did not, however, alter the fact that
such interference in the firms' decisions as to which markets
to supply played havoc with their long-term export develop-
ment strategies.- 24 -
(5) As their local-content requirements increased over time,
the firms were forced to buy locally a higher proportion
of their intermediate inputs. The prices of these local inputs,
however, were often much higher than those of the previously
imported ones, not to mention their other disadvantages. The
local input prices were also less frequently subjected to
government controls than the prices or profit margins of the
final assembly firms. Consequently, these firms suffered a
steady erosion in their profitability over long periods of
time until the government could be convinced, after prolonged
negotiations, to grant them price increases.
These complaints of the DFI firms were discussed by the author
with several government officials and their responses were
solicited. We now present these responses.
(1) The officials of the Department of Encouragement and Imple-
mentation in the Ministry of Industry and Technology rejected
the complaint about the over-ambitiousness of Assembly Industry
Code, concerning the ascending local-content requirements.
They argued that the Code had been vital to the development of
Turkish manufacturing. Without it very few firms would have
come even close to the prevailing, local-content, levels. Firms
had to be pushed along, even if initially the efficiency and
quality effects might have been adverse. In the long-run, as
Turkish manufacturing gained experience with increasing local-
content levels, such effects would become progressively less
important.
In fact, these officials claimed, the Assembly Industry Code
had already accomplished its mission and its appropriateness
could no longer be a relevant issue for debate. Almost all the
sectors it had originally covered had reached the relatively
high local-content levels that made it no longer appropriate
to refer to those sectors as assembly industries. The Ministry
of Industry and Technology had already drafted a new Manufactur-
ing Industry Code to replace the Assembly Industry Code in the
near future.- 25 -
The DFI officials of the State Planning Organization (SPO)
aud the Ministry of Commerce subscribed to the same view.
All the government officials interviewed strongly supported
Turkey's general import-substitution strategy of industrializ-
ation and its corollary of local-content maximization. They
showed little awareness of or belief in international intra-
industry, i.e. component specialization,not to mention inter-
industry specialization. Turkey could produce almost anything
if the government pursued the right policies. The implicit
main objective was to advance Turkey's self-sufficiency as
far as possible and thereby mi imize its dependence on the
rest of the world.
(2) All the government officials interviewed blamed the DFI
firms themselves for whatever problems they might have had
in meeting their local-content requirements. The SPO claimed
that these firms had a built-in bias toward importing as many
components as possible in order to maximize the scope of
transfer-pricing and also prevent Turkey from increasing its
industrial self-sufficiency. Many DFI firms sought delays in
meeting their local-content requirements, often inventing ex-
cuses. The SPO was sympathetic whenever their requests for
delay were due to unforeseen and unavoidable circumstances.
The Ministry of Commerce DFI officials wondered why the DFI
firms failed to object initially to their insufficient physical
capacity levels, legislated in their decrees, for meeting their
local-content requirements over time. In most cases, firms de-
liberately understated their necessary, decree-authorized
capacity projections. The reasons for the understatement were
to restrict supply for earning excess profits in their captive
markets and to purposefully fail in meeting their local-content
requirements. Like their SPO colleagues, these officials argued
that the government did not force DFI firms to reduce their-26 -
estimated necessary capacity levels when they applied for
new or expansion decrees. On the contrary, they were often
required to increase their projected capacities, during the
negotiations preceding the issuance of their decrees.But
even then firms sought delays in implementing their decree-
authorized capacity-increase schedules with invented excuses
for which the government had no sympathy.
(3) All the DFI officials interviewed rejected the claim of DFI
firms that their failure to meet export-commitments was related
to the increasing local-content requirements. It was the -.'inns'
responsibility, during the decree negotiations with the govern-
ment, to make sure that they would be able to meet all their
commitments that were written into their decrees. If they were
not sure, they could certainly withdraw their applications.
And, whenever they could later prove to the government that
their failure to meet some of their commitments on time was
due to factors beyond their control, they would be granted the
necessary delays.
The officials argued that the widespread reluctance of DFI
firms to promote exports should be traced to reasons other than
their increasing local-content commitments. The firms were
accused of concentrating on domestic sales because of the
higher profit margins, thanks to the protection the government
provided from competitive imports. They were also suspected
of preventing exports from Turkey in order not toaspoil the
foreign markets already supplied from non-Turkish operations
of their parent firms.
(A) The DFI officials of the Ministry of Commerce and the SPO
claimed that the government had the right to license Turkish
exports after giving priority to domestic demand. This was a
natural right and responsibility of any government. Only a few
DFI firms, such as the tire and margarine producing ones, had- 27 -
their exports restricted or prohibited because of serious
domestic shortages. If these firms had really wanted, they
could have earlier built sufficient capacity to meet both
domestic and foreign demand.
This complaint was regarded as a bogus issue by the government
officials. It was just another excuse put forward by the DFI
firms to justify their poor export performance.
Actually many DFI firms were unable to meet their export-
commitments despite export incentives such as tax rebates
and import allowances offered by the government.
(5) Most of the DFI officials accepted the complaint of the DFI
firms that their local input prices were above world prices
and that the quality of the local inputs was also relatively
deficient. The government had recognized this and offered the
DFI firms, together with all-Turkish firms, several export
promotion incentives to overcome their deficiencies.
Furthermore, the government was seriously considering subsidiz-
ing the intermediate input requirements of all primarily export-
oriented manufacturing firms so that their prices to the firms
would be no higher than the world prices. This would answer
the complaint of the DFI firms to a large extent.
Even after discounting the complaints of DFI firms for the
normal one-sidedness and exaggeration by taking into account
the responses of government officials, our conclusion is that
they appeared to have considerable justification. The expecta-
tions and demands of government officials concerning local-
contents and export-commitments seemed to be based not on
specific and detailed analyses of individual DFI projects but
rather on their strong commitment to Turkey's indiscriminatory- 28 -
import-substitution industrialization, which itself
accounted for the basic failure of DFI firms to meet all
such expectations and demands.
B. The Controversy on Foreign Equity Shares
Attention now turns to the complaint of DFI firms about the
government's pressure to reduce foreign equity shares and the
responses of government officials to this complaint.
Most DFI firms contended that the Turkish government exerted
constant pressure on them for the reduction of the foreign equity
share, especially when it was over 50 per cent. Often the govern-
ment would insist on foreign equity share reduction as a condition
for approving expansion decrees.
Furthermore, the government set conditions on how the DFI firms
could go about reducing their foreign equity share. First, the
government (the SPO) would have to approve to whom the foreign-
owned shares could be sold. The foreign partivsrs were not allowed
to sell their shares to Turkish investors of their own choice.
Second, the government (the Ministry of Finance) would*, have to approve
the prices at which the foreign shares could be sold to Turkish
investors. Often the government objected to the prices that had
been freely agreed upon between the foreign sellers and Turkish
buyers as too high.
The government adopted the simplistic view that Turkey's benefits
from DFI projects could be always enhanced by limiting foreigners
to minority ownership, without making any distinction among
different types of projects. It insisted that any DFI firm in
which the foreign investors had held majority interest at the
outset would have to eventually make way for Turkish majority
interest.- 29 -
Several DFI firms that had been already operating in Turkey
for many years with foreign majority interest, a few of them
with 100 per cent foreign ownership, argued that it was unfair
for the government to apply its anti-foreign-majority-ownership
policy to them. It, of course, had the right to exclude foreigners
from majority ov-irship in new DFI enterprises, letting them decide
whether they would invest in Turkey under that condition. The
old DFI firms, however, in which foreign majority ownership had
been initially allowed, should be left alone as long as they
continued to operate according to their decrees. By imposing
on them the unreasonable and ideological demand for minority
foreign ownership, the government violated its side of the bargain,
created mistrust, and disrupted their smooth operation. What real
economic benefits could Turkey derive from this short-sighted
policy that exacerbated the deterioration of the DFI climate in
the country? Could the government at least not allow the foreign
investors to choose freely the Turkish investors to whom they
wished to sell their equity interests at prices agreed on between
themselves, without any official interference and pressure? Such
interference and pressure often pushed the foreign investors to
sell out completely and abandon their operations for once and all,
vowing never to invest in Turkey again. A few firms, on the other
hand, had refused to bow so quickly to the government's demand
and gone to Danistay, the High Turkish Court, in order to maintain
the status quo, at least during litigation.
There was a consensus among foreign investors that the relatively
recent government drive to reduce foreign equity interests in
the existing DFI firms across the board was just another manifes-
tation of the SPO's general anti-DFI stance. This drive did not
discriminate among sectors and firms. It ignored the fact that
some firms could not continue their operations very effectively
without foreign majority ownership that made foreign management
control possible and worthwhile.,Furthermore, it took no notice- 30 -
of the fact that some foreign (parent) firms that had invested
in Turkey had longstanding policies of not maintaining their
presence in developing countries that denied them majority
ownership and management control. Turkish DFI officials were
uninformed or ill-informed about such critical sector-and-
firm-specific characteristics. Their ignorance was, of course,
not an innocent one, given their deeply entrenched ideological
opposition to DFI. Increasing their access to relevant information
would be unlikely to change their negative attitude.
The responses of government officials to these views of DFI
firms were the following:
The SPO's officials denied that there was an indiscriminatory
drive to reduce foreign equity shares, attributed to their alledged
anti-DFI stance. In the first place, how could Turkey carry out
such a drive, that would entail significant foreign exchange
transfers abroad when the country was literally beset by inter-
national bankruptcy? Turkey simply had no current means to compen-
sate in convertible currencies the foreign investors who wished,
or were presumably forced, to transfer abroad the values of their
Turkish DFI assets. This complaint, like most others put forward
by the DFI firms, was unfounded, reflecting their paranoia and
efforts to badmouth the Turkish government for their self-interest.
It was, however, conceded that the SPO favored, in general, the
gradual reduction of foreign equity share over time after the
establishment of a DFI firm. Why? Because over time DFI's economic
contribution to a given enterprise and to the national economy was
bound to decline. DFI's major expected contribution was the
transfer of new technologies and organizational skills to Turkey.
After a DFI firm had been in operation for many years, its
existence as a foreign enterprise began to lose justification in
terms of national interests. Turkish nationals would be able
later on to keep that enterprise going without much, if any, foreign- 31 -
technological and organizational know-how. In short, Turkey
1s
interest warranted turkizing a DFI firm some time after its
establishment, when it had "matured".
When asked whether they had considered formulating an explicit
fade-out system in which each DFI firm would be turkized accord-
ing to a time schedule specified at the outset, the SPO officials
replied that they had indeed considered it for incorporation
into the IV. Five Year Development Plan (1979-1984) but decided
not to. There were several drawbacks to the operation of such a
system that they did not know how to deal with. The specification
of a time schedule for each firm that might later prove to be a
miscalculation, and the protection of the long-term viability of
an enterprise as the foreign interests in it decreased and became
concerned solely with squeezing it for maximum terminal profits
were mentioned as the major difficulties that would arise.
The SPO officials emphasized that they had imposed no fixed and
rigit initial maximum foreign share on new DFI firms. It all
depended on the project in question. For example, a project totally
or primarily export-oriented would be permitted majority ownership,
and even 100 per cent foreign equity. Projects for producing
intermediate products and investment goods would also receive fa-
vorable consideration. In fact, the higher the expected contribu-
tion of the project in terms of transferring critical technological
and organizational know-how to Turkey, and the higher the priority
that had been assigned to the project in the national development
plan, the greater the foreign equity share the SPO would permit
in that project. In short, it was simply untrue that the SPO
was opposed to foreign majority ownership in all DFI projects
because of its alleged ideological aversion to foreign presence
in the Turkish economy. If it had recently rejected several pro-
posals that had been predicated on foreign majority ownership
and management control, the reasons should be sought in the failure
of these proposals to meet Turkey's urgent priorities that justi-
fied allowing foreign majority ownership and management control only
in special cases.- 32 -
Furthermore, the SPO expressed its willingness to postpone
indefinitely the partial or complete turkizing of a DFI
enterprise, if the foreign investors could demonstrate con-
clusively that they were continuing to transfer new technologies
that were still unavailable to Turkey otherwise. Such a firm
would receive preferential treatment regardless of the percentage
of its foreign ownership.
Finally, the SPO officials defended the government's right to
determine, when necessary, to which Turkish interests foreign
investors should sell their shares. The SPO had no ideological
bias in favor of State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) as candidates
to take over the foreign interests in DFI firms. In a few recent
cases, it had insisted on the sale of DFI assets to SEEs on
pragmatic grounds and for national interest only. There existed
also cases in which private Turkish interests were allowed to buy
DFI assets. DFI firms had, however, played up the first type of
cases, ignoring conveniently the second type. The SPO approached
the question of the identity of Turkish interests who should or
should not take over DFI assets, as it approached all other related
questions; on a pragmatic, case-by-case basis, with the sole aim
of protecting and promoting national welfare.
The DFI officials of the Ministry of Commerce argued that it
had become a widespread policy all over the world, especially
in the developing countries, to reduce gradually the foreign equity
shares in DFI firms. Turkey had not invented this policy and was
not unique in implementing it. Foreign investors should know
better and realize that Turkey would not ignore global trends in
DFI policy-making.- 33 -
Although the government had not (yet) instituted an explicit
fade-out system for the gradual turkizing of DFI enterprises,
it was nevertheless determined to accomplish the basic objective.
It would, however, recognizing exceptions, allow those DFI firms
that could prove their continued significant contributions to
the Turkish economy, to maintain their foreign majority ownership
and management control. These officials doubted, however, that
there could be many exceptions to weaken the general trend toward
eventual turkizing.
Going beyond the views expressed by their SPO colleagues, these
officials adduced another reason for foreign minority ownership.
DFI firms were, in general,.-harder to regulate than all-Turkish
ones. Those in which foreigners had majority ownership and manage-
ment control were especially hard to regulate, in order to curb
their illegal practices and make them serve better national
economic objectives. Such firms refused to become fully integrated
into the Turkish economy, preferring to remain as mere assembly
operations, and frustrated the government in its efforts to
implement effectively its import-substitution strategy of
industrialization. The government was simply not (yet) capable
of controlling these firms to its satisfaction. Until it could
become a match for them, the government had no choice but to have
as few of them around as possible.
The DFI officials of the Ministry of Finance, who responded to
the complaint about government interference in the determination
of the prices of foreign DFI assets sold to Turkish nationals,
put the blame squarely on Law 6224. This law stipulateds in Article
4, Clause (a) Part (2) that foreign DFI assets would be sold
"within reasonable prices", which were not defined in Turkish tax
laws, creating yet another ambiguity. After all, these officials
almost gleefully remarked, Law 6224 was not really a Turkish law
in its genesis, since it had been drafted by an American expert, and,therefore, it contained such defects. It was basically a
"foreign" law and, therefore, foreigners had no real right
to complain about it. They had imposed it on Turkey hoping
to create for themselves the most favorable DFI conditions.
Foreign DFI asset prices could be determined by alternative
methods. The Ministry of Finance preferred the method of
capitalizing net earnings at the interest rates prevailing on
long-term Turkish government bonds. DFI firms, on the other hand,
preferred the stock market share prices method, arguing that the
government's arbitrary method grossly undervalued their assets.
The government, however, believed that the Turkish stock market,
fledgling and thin, lent itself easily to manipulation for arti-
ficial price movements by interested parties. The method of taking
the stock market prices as true values of DFI assets was no less
arbitrary than the government's method, these officials claimed.
Furthermore, in the calculations for determining DFI asset values
the government used the Turkish lira (TL) as the unit of account,
whereas the foreign investors wished to work with convertible
foreign currency units to protect themselves against inflation and/
or devaluation while waiting for the Central Bank to find scarce
foreign exchange for the necessary transfers. These officials
appreciated the concern of foreign investors to protect the foreign
exchange values of their assets, but the Turkish government could
naturally use TL only as its unit of account. Besides, Law 6224
did not offer any foreign exchange guarantees to foreign investors.
They had, therefore, no legal ground for requesting the use of a
foreign currency unit in the negotiations for determining DFI asset
sale values. They had to carry the foreign exchange risk as a cost
of doing business in Turkey, as they did elsewhere.
On this issue of majority versus minority foreign ownership at
least, the Turkish overnment officials appeared to be well-informed,
flexible and pragmatic, contrary to the assertions of DFI firms.- 35 -
The position of government officials was convincingly articulated
to this author. Of course, their pronouncements were presumed
to reflect their genuine convictions and form the basis of
their actual decisions.
6. Investment Application - Approval Lag
Mean = 9.6 months (m) Standard -Deviation = 11.4 m
Standard Error = 2.3 m
Minimum = 0.0 m Maximum = 45.0 m
Valid Observations = 25 Missing Observations = 21
There was, according to the questionnaire results, an average lag
of about 10 months between the DFI applications and their approval
by the Turkish government. The interviews with DFI firms indicated
that this lag had been increasing lately. Most DFI firms were highly
critical of the government's failure to act on their DFI applications
promptly and attributed it to the general and intensified anti-DFI
stance of the Turkish bureaucracy. This complaint of the DFI firms
and the responses of government officials will be examined below
after the review of the sectoral differences in the investment appli-
cation - approval lag.
Table 10 - Sectoral Investment Application - Approval Lags
Sector














6. Non-electrical Machinery 13.5
and Metal Products- 36 -
Sector Investment Application - Approval Lag
Sectoral Mean (months)
7. Electrical Cables 17.3
8. Electrical Machinery 13.6
and Electronics
9. Building Materials 6.0
This considerable variation among the sectors could have several
possible reasons. First, in terms of the specific years in which a
sector's DFI applications were concentrated, we would expect the
sectors with more recent applications to have suffered from longer
lags, as a result of Turkey's steadily tightening DFI policies, partly
a reflection of its increasing general ambivalence if not hostility
toward all DFI. Second, different sectors might have different mixes
of all-new DFI applications and expansion- or modernization-DFI
applications. The latter would tend to be associated with longer
approval lag as the discussion below of interview results indicates.
Third, different sectors might be effective to different degrees in
their legal and illegal efforts to influence the bureaucrats and poli-
ticians in Ankara for quicker action and decision. Fourth, periods of
higher domestic political instability and weaker coalition governments
would be more likely to cause longer approval lags for DFI applications
made in such periods. Of course, there might be other plausible reasons.
A. The Controversy on the Review and Approval of DFI Applications
We now discuss in detail the complaint of DFI firms about the length
of the investment application-approval lag and the responses of
government officials to it.
It took too long for most DFI firms to have their decrees issued by
the Council of Ministers. Recently, the average time between a
firm's application for a decree and its publication in the Official
Gazette had been about two years. The long delays were caused by
either bureaucratic or political obstacles or both. The delays
appeared to have been longer for expansion projects than for new ones.- 37 -
The bureaucratic obstacles to processing of decree applications
were most serious in the State Planning Organization (SPO).
Sometimes months passed before the SPO got around to responding
to firms' inquries about the state of their decree applications.
The SPO often refused to respond to oral inquiries, insisting
that all communication between itself and the firms should be
in writing. Occasionally, letters written by firms to the SPO
or the Ministry of Commerce, and even a few draft decrees under
consideration in the Council of Ministers, had been lost. Many
firms were convinced that most of the bureaucratic obstacles
that prevented the processing of their decree applications within
a reasonable period of time, such as three or four months, were
caused by the Turkish bureaucracy's, especially the SPO's,
entrenched anti-DFI attitude.
The political obstacles were encountered after a draft decree
prepared by the SPOS was sent by the Ministry of Commerce to the
Council of Ministers, which had to be signed by all the ministers
before its publication in the Official Gazette as a decree.
During coalition governments, especially those in which the
National Salvation Party had been a partner, some draft decrees
were blocked for more than a year, sometimes lacking only one or
two signatures to become official. Not all firms whose draft
decrees had been blocked in the Council of Ministers blamed the
National Salvation Party's ideological anti-DFI stance for their
problems. Some accused other DFI or all-Turkish firms of
intervening politically to prevent the approval of their draft
decrees by the Council of Ministers. It was slightly amusing to
hear during the interviews several DFI firms blame each other
for resorting to such political pressures.
Firms argued that the long delays in getting their decrees issued
forced them to make important changes in the feasibility studies
underlying their original decree applications and to ask the SPO,- 38 -
in the post-decree stage, to allow for such changes. Often
the SFO responded unfavorably to these requests, compelling
the firms to either give up the projects authorized by their
decrees or go ahead with the necessary changes unofficially
whenever possible. Of course, x/hen a firm was not in strict
compliance with its decree(s), it faced the danger of having
its decrees annulled and operations terminated by the Turkish
government. Nevertheless, some firms did deliberately step out
of the bounds of their decrees and were not detected by either
the Ministry of Commerce of the SPO, which were unable to
regulate effectively the operations of DFI firms.
Neither the Ministry of Commerce nor the SPO denied that DFI
firms had a legitimate complaint concerning the time it took
for the issuance of their decrees. Both of them denied, however,
that they themselves caused this problem because of their
alleged anti-DFI attitude, although the Ministry of Commerce
believed that the SPO came close to deserving its anti-DFI
labelling by DFI firms.
The DFI Division, a part of the Encouragement and Implementation
Department, in the Ministry of Commerce, by its own admission,
was not equipped to serve as an effective regulatory agency.
Besides lacking the statutory authority for performing such a
role, it simply did not have the necessary manpower and expertise.
In early 1979, this division consisted of three officials only,
none of whom considered himself an expert on DFI.
The chief of this division noted that until January 1978 his
division tried to carry out systematically technological and
microeconomic evaluations of all DFI applications for new or
expansion projects, by relying on the expertise of several
technical consultants. These consultants had been hired on
special worK-contracts, enabling them to receive higher than- 39 -
average salaries paid to regular bureaucrats. After the
Ecevit government came to power in January 1978, however, these
experts were summarily fired, on the suspicion that they had
been political sympathizers of the previous, National Front
government of Demirel. In order to avoid the (justified)
accusation, and possible subsequent legal action, that the
firings had been political, the government also eliminated the
positions of these experts. In other words, no new experts
were hired to replace the ones who had been fired.
Therefore, the chief of the Ministry of Commerce's DFI
Division stated, his Division was no longer capable of evaluating
DFI applications on a technical level. It simply forwarded them
to the SPO after receiving them from established or prospective
investors. In fact, it was both legally and technically restricted
to acting merely as an intermediary between investors and the
SPO. It had no active role to play.
The Ministry of Commerce was disatisfied with its present passive
intermediary role. In the words of its DFI Division's chief, it
carried the drum on its back but the stick was in the hands of
the SPO. It would prefer to have the drum taken off its back
and let the SPO have both the drum and the stick. By being rid
of its intermediary role in the DFI area, it would also shift
all the blame for the long bureaucratic delays in the issuance
of decrees to the SPO, which it considered to be often dogmatic
and too strict with foreign investors.
Chief of the Ministry of Commerce's DFI Division conceded that
occasionally letters of DFI firms were lost inside his division,
blaming this on an inadequate filing system and the bad per-
formance of poorly paid clerks. But he argued that this was not
too serious and frequent a problem to account for most of the
bureaucratic delays in the issuance of DFI decrees. He intimated- 40 -
that the real problem was the SPO's inability and/or un-
willingness to process DFI applications speedily enough.
He also acknowledged that frequently all-Turkish or DFI firms
did intervene on either the bureaucratic or the political level
to prevent the approval of DFI applications by present or
prospective competitors in their sectors. Often the smaller
all-Turkish firms were much more concerned about new or
increasing competitive threats from the larger DFI firms. He
surmised that that sort of thing could not have been special
to Turkey. It had to be expected from any private firm threatened
by new comers anywhere. He doubted that too many DFI applications
had been rejected as a result of lobbying by rival investors,
although their approval might have been considerably delayed.
The DFI Division of the SPO's Economic Planning Department
denied that it was anti-DFI and that it deliberately delayed the
processing of DFI applications or the issuance of DFI decrees.
It claimed that the reasons for the deliberate delays in the
issuance of decrees were political and that it had nothing to do
with them. It did acknowledge, however, that being short of
expert personnel, it was unable to process DFI applications
as expeditiously as it should. The SPO's DFI Division consisted
of two economists only, one of whom was on leave for most of
the two years during which this study was carried out.
After receiving a DFI application via the Ministry of Commerce,
this Division subjected it to a preliminary economic evaluation.
If that was favorable, then the sector specialists of the SPO
were asked to evaluate the technological aspects of the proposed
project. These two steps took at least three to four months and
often much longer. Now, both the two experts of the DFI Division
and the sector specialists had other duties, most importantly
those relating to the preparation of the five-year national- 41 -
development plans and their annual implementation programs,
besides evaluating DFI applications. It appeared that
evaluating DFI applications was their neither top-priority
nor major concern. When their more important tasks demanded
their immediate attention and time, they simply put aside
the DFI applications waiting for evaluation for later con-
siderations. Hence, the usually long delays in the SPO's
processing of DFI applications.
Evidently, the SPO did not view DFI as an important vehicle for
Turkey's industrial development. Its skepticism, if not disbelief,
about the actual and expected benefits of DFI came across during
the talks with its top officials and experts. The long delays in
its processing of DFI applications could not have been solely
or directly due to the lack of adequate manpower. Instead, it
appeared that the SPO did not wish to provide urgently the
necessary inputs for this task which it considered to be, at
best, of secondary positive importance, and at worst, of primary
negative importance.
The SPO asserted that the DFI firms themselves occasionally
engineered delays for the issuance of their own decrees as well
as those of others. Some firms were alleged to keep on making
changes in their decree; applications after submitting them,
insisting on lengthy consultations with their parent firms before
responding to changes requested by the SPO, and not providing to
the SPO all the information necessary for the evaluation of their
applications. The SPO was convinced that occasionally DFI firms
applied for certain projects in order to preempt, or possibly
discourage other local or foreign investors, with no real inten-
tion, at least not immediately, of going ahead with those projects,
With that aim, the SPO claimed, they were interested in neither
the speedy approval of their applications nor the quick imple-- 42 -
mentation of their decrees. They simply wished to position
themselves advantageously in Turkey against present and/or
future competitors.
Although this assertion might have been true in some instances,
the SPO appeared to over-generalize about the bad faith of DFI
firms. Even if that assertion were true more often than not, it
could be argued that the over-protection of Turkish manufacturing
against foreign competition by the government itself created a
favorable situation for DFI firms with bad faith, which wished
to avoid or minimize competition. It would not be too difficult
for the Turkish government to create an adequate competitive
pressure on foreign and national investors to prevent them from
trying to pre-monopolize their markets by taking out investment
options that they do not wish to exercise immediately. A DFI
decree should not necessarily become a preemptive device if it
were readily available to all potential investors on equally
attractive terms and if the market were not closed to all import
competition. Furthermore, it should be noted that if the Turkish
government were to issue DFI decrees more expeditiously, it would
be more justified in insisting on their speedy implementation
without any changes.
The SPO, too, acknowledged that DFI and all-Turkish firms often
intervened on the bureaucratic and/or political levels to hinder
the approval of rival DFI firms' decree applications. It claimed,
however, that it itself was impervious to such intervention and
lobbying. It was used to such pressures and ignored them when
In order to prevent DFI firms from "sleeping on their decrees", as
the SPO put it, all recent decrees were required to contain a specific
time schedule for their implementation. But, the SPO complained, firms
too often acked for changes and/or delays before implementing their
decrees in their original forms.evaluating DFI applications strictly on their own merits. It
could not, however, do anything against them after it sent
draft decrees, via the Ministry of Commerce, to the Council of
Ministers for final approval. In fact, the SPO noted, against
its own wishes several draft decrees were blocked in the
Coundil of Ministers for several months, and some for more
than a year. In such cases, it was sympathetic to requests of
the firms involved in introduce modifications into the sub-
stance and/or implementation of their long-^delayed decrees,
when such firms confronted unfavorable technological and/or
economic conditions, unforeseen at the time of their applications.
This was confirmed by a few DFI firms during the interviews.
The head of the SPO's Economic Planning Department, in which the
DFI Division was located, stated that the SPO was well aware
of the problem of its anti-DFI reputation. He argued that this
problem sprang from the SPO's efforts toward an increasingly
effective bargaining with prospective and established DFI firms
and also from the idiosyncrasies of Turkish bureaucracy.
Basically the SPO tried to maximize, he explained, the long-term
benefits that would accrue to the local partner and to the Turkish
economy from a DFI project. However, often the local partner was
so interested in his short-term profits from a speedy approval
and realization of the DFI project that he paid little attention
to his and the country's long-term benefits. Consequently, like
the foreign partner, he accused the SPO of obstructionism and
ideological opposition to DFI. This was, the chief economic
planner claimed, the real source of the friction between the
SPO and DFI enterprises.
He argued that DFI firms should realize that the SPO tried to be
a careful bargainer to protect the nation's economic interests.
They should accept and not complain about this. In the past, many- 44 -
DFI projects had been approved without much bargaining, leading
to substantial losses for Turkey. He added that later on some
of these projects had to be subjected to necessary re-bargaining
to set some obvious wrongs right.
There was considerable truth in the complaint of DFI firms that
the SPO's decisions .on DFI matters were not quick enough. The
reasons for this, however, were not the SPO's alleged obstruc-
tionism and ideological opposition to DFI. According to the
chief economic planner, the reasons were the following:
(1) Turkish bureaucracy was reluctant to make quick decisions
because of the possible political distortions of its
decisions. In order to protect itself against any future
accusations it had to justify on paper and to document
thoroughly all its decisions. It always found it to its
disadvantage to be flexible, to make quick and/or sweeping
decisions. Under the constant shadow of alleged improper
and illegal dealings, favoritism, bribery, etc., it could
not help being cautious and, therefore, often slow. The
SPO was no exception to this.
(2) The SPO had to reckon with the political priorities and
preferences of the government in power in its decision-making.
It had to be in tune with the views and objectives of the
Council of Ministers and the High Planning Council. This was
a serious constraint on the SPO's flexibility, especially
when the government's position was not clearly defined or
understood.
(3) The SPO had to share its decision-making power and consult
with other government agencies such as the Ministries of
Commerce, Finance, and Industry and Technology. Often consul-
tation and cooperation were difficult and time-consuming,
especially when different political parties occupied different
ministries in coalition governments.- 45 -
Related to the last two problems was the lack of a definite
sectoral and project-based industrialization strategy that
would make it relatively easy to identify those DFI applications
deserving the SPO's urgent attention. Such a strategy would have
to entail a strongly selective and highly specific industrial
investment incentives scheme, instead of the general and in-
effective scheme administered by the Ministry of Industry and
Technology at that time.
The head of the SPO's Economic Planning Department wished th'.it
the recently prepared yet unofficial DFI Implementation Code,
supplementing Law 6224, (which is yet to become official) would
help to alleviate the long delays in the processing of DFI appli-
cations. He emphasized that the SPO was not an enemy of DFI
but should also never be expected to allow DFI to exploit
Turkey as DFI had done in the old days.
The SPO was quite sympathetic about the difficult position of
the Ministry of Commerce in the chain of the DFI application-
evaluation process. Being caught between the DFI firms and the
SPO, with no legal authority of making important decisions on
its own about DFI, the Ministry of Commerce unnecessarily
wasted both its own and the DFI firms' time and other resources,
according to the SPO. It would be better for all concerned to
free the Ministry of Commerce from its intermediary role, but
this would require new legislation authorizing the necessary
administrative changes.
 l
From the interviews conducted at the Ministry of Commerce and
the SPO a consensus emerged on the desirability of restricting
the approval of the Council of Ministers to only the founding
DFI decrees, i.e. those authorizing the establishment of new DFI
firms. Then DFI decrees for expansion projects or any other
purposes, such as increases in capitalization or changes in- 46 -
foreign equity shares would acquire the force of law without
going through the Council of Ministers. This could be done
if the Council of Ministers, via an Authorization Decree, were
to delegate its authority of approval to the SPO and the
Ministry of Commerce for post-founding DFI decrees. Both
government agencies agreed that this would save much time and
trouble for both the established DFI firms and themselves. This
could be considered a promising administrative reform, although
not far-reaching, that would eliminate some, but by no means all
of the deliberate delays caused by political (as opposed to
bureaucratic) obstacles.
This would make, in our opinion also, eminently good sense in
that although allowing the establishment of a new DFI firm could
be argued to be a political decision as well as an economic one,
approving its various aspects of development over time (to be
sure, within certain political guidelines enunciated by the
government) should be basically an economic, not political,
decision. The present over-politicization in Turkey of all final-
decision-making about DFI might be explained in terms such things
as Turkey's unfortunate experience with the Capitulations and
the lack of confidence in Turkish bureaucracy's ability to make
economic decisions non-politically (since the bureaucracy itself
is thoroughly politicized). Providing satisfactory explanations
for this state of affairs does not, however, eliminate the
necessity for separating the political and non-political aspects
of DFI decisions, if Turkey wishes to utilize DFI more effectively
for its development. For the Council of Ministers itself to serve
as the custodian or watchdog of DFI firms, besides not providing
an effective regulatory mechanism, actually creates an unfa-
vorable environment in which en economic benefit-cost approach
to analyzing the effects of DFI on Turkish manufacturing becomes
almost irrelevant, if not impossible.- 47 -
7. Investment Motives
We now turn to the motives for DFI in Turkish manufacturing. The
important motives are clearly both a function of the Turkish
industrialization policies and a determinant of the effects of
DFI on the development of Turkish manufacturing. In other words,
there is a definite feed-back process or mutual dependence
between them.
DFI Motive 1: High Expected Rate of Return in Supplying Primarily
the Turkish Market.













































0. Unimportant 1. Of little importance 2. Quite important
3. Very important
Mean = 1.558
Standard Error = 0.157
Standard Deviation = 1.031
Mode = 2- 48 -
DFI Motive 2: Increasing Turkish Import Restrictions Which Began to
Endanger Exports to Turkey and Forced Protection of
the Turkish Market by DFI.




















































DFI Motive 3; Rapid Expected Growth of the Turkish Economy and




























Absolute Relative Adjusted Cumulative

















Total 46 100.0 100.0
Same as above.
Mean = 2.372
Standard Error = 0.145
Standard Deviation = 0.952
Mode = 3
DFI Motive 4: Lower Unit Production Costs Than in Parent Firm's Country
Which Could Be Supplied by Exports from Turkey.








Absolute Relative Adjusted Cumulative

























Total 46 100.0 100.0- 50 -
Table 14 Continued
* Same as above
Mean = 0.419
Standard Error = 0.112
Standard Deviation = 0.731
Mode = 0
DFI Motive 5; Direct Investments in Turkey by Other Foreign Firms.




































Total 46 100.0 100.0
Same as above.
Mean = 0.698
Standard Error = 0.139
Standard Deviation = 0.914
Mode = 0- 51 -
DFI Motive 6: Incentives and Guarantees Offered by the Turkish
Government for DFI.




















































DFI Motive 7: Incentives and Guarantees Offered by the Parent Firm's
Government for DFI.






Absolute Relative Adjusted Cumulative























































DFI Motive 8: Other Considerations



























































We can determine the relative importance of these eight DFI motives
by the ranking of their mean values%
Table 19 - Relative Importance of DFI Motives
DFI Motive (Number) Mean
Rapid Expected Growth of 2.372
the Turkish Economy (3)
High Expected Rate of Return 1.558
in the Turkish Market (1)
Increasing Turkish Import 1.535
Restrictions (2)
Turkish Government Incentives 1.000
and Guarantees (6)
DFI by Other Firms in 0.698
Turkey (5)
Other Considerations (8) 0.698
Parent Firm's Government 0.442
Incentives and Guarantees (7)
Lower Turkish Cc>ts for Turkish 0.419
Export Base (4)
Level of Importance
Quite Important to Very
Important
Of Little Importance to
Quite Important
Of Little Importance to
Quite Important
Of Little Importance
Unimportant to Of Little
Importance
Unimportant to Of Little
Importance
Unimportant to Of Little
Importance
Unimportant to Of Little
Importance- 54 -
The highest relative importance of the rapid expected growth of
the host country's economy and increase in the demand for DFI firms'
products has been confirmed by several previous studies, for different
countries, in the empirical DFI literature. Since the early 1950's,
Turkey's potential for rapid economic growth has been realized to
a significant extent, despite serious strategic mistakes in economic
policy-making. The most harmful of these mistakes was clearly the
adoption of an indiscriminatory import-substitution strategy of
industrialization that has deprived Turkey of a higher and more
stable pattern of real growth than it has experienced. It should
also be noted that Turkey has chosen to finance its basically
autarchic and closed-economy industrialization by international
(public and private) loans. It has suffered international bankruptcy
twice (in 1958 and 1978) in twenty years because it could not meet
its international debt obligations, having almost completely
neglected the creation of industrial export-base. In short, Turkish
economic growth has averaged a respectable real rate of about 7 per
cent per annum during 1950 - 1977, but its unsteady pattern has
exacted too heavy a cost in terms of: (1) an increasing and crushing
international debt burden, (2) an internationally non-competitive
industrial sector, which depends heavily on imported inputs, but
fails badly to generate the exports that can pay for its imports and
also contribute to financing Turkey's international indebtedness,
and (3) an intensifying and spreading conviction on the Turkish
political right and the left that Turkey is incapable of achieving
speedy and self-sustaining industrialization under a system of
Western parliamentary democracy and free private-enterprise.
Obviously, the next two important DFI motives for our questionnaire
respondents, i.e. the high expected rate of return on DFI in
supplying primarily the Turkish market and the increasing Turkish
import restrictions which began to endanger the parent firm's exports
to Turkey and forced it to protect its Turkish market by DFI, are
very closely related to the most important DFI motive, i.e. the rapidTable 20 - Sectoral Mean Values of DFI Motives
Sector
DFI Motive -.1 2 3 4 5
1. High Expected 1.000 2.667 1.429 1.600 1.143 1.800 .1.333 1.778 1.000
Rate of Return
2. Import Restrictions 0.000 1.667 1.286 2.600 2.286 1.000 1.000 1.667 0.000
3. Rapid Expected 3.000 2.667 2.571 2.000 2.714 1.600 1.667 2.778 1.500
Economic Growth
4. Lower Turkish Costs 0.000 1.333 0.143 0.400 0.000 0.200 1.000 0.778 0.000
for Export Base
5. DFI by Other Firms 0.000 0.667 0.571 1.800 0.429 0.000 2.000 0.667 0.000
6. Turkish Government 0.500 0.667 1.286 1.200 0.857 0.600 0.667 1.444 0.500
Incentives
7. Parent Firm's 0.500 0.000 0.143 0.000 0.857 0.200 0.667 0.778 0.500 '
Government Incentives en
8. Other Considerations 0.000 0.000 0.429 0.600 1.286 1.200 0.000 0.667 1.500
1. Food and beverages 2. Rubber 3. Chemicals 4. Pharmaceuticals 5. Transportation vehicles and tractors
6. Non-electrical machinery 7. Electrical cables 8. Electrical machinery and electronics
9. Building Materials-.56 -
expected growth of the Turkish economy and increase of denand for
the DFI firm's products. Their close complementarity is a mani-
festation of the Turkish import-substitution strategy of industria-
lization that has become more and more markedly indiscriminatory
since the mid-I960's. It is this strategy that also explains the
lowest revealed importance of lower unit production costs than
in the parent firm's country that could help create a Turkish export
base. In turn, the lowest revealed importance of this DFI motive
explains why DFI firms in Turkey have done actually so little
exporting.
We observe that DFI motive 3, the rapid expected growth of the
Turkish economy and increase of demand for the DFI firms' products
had the largest mean value in sectors 1,2,3,5,8 and 9 and the second
largest mean value in the other three sectors among all the DFI
motives. Therefore, we can conclude that this DFI motive was a
highly important one for all the individual sectors.
8. DFI Incentives Provided by the Turkish Government After DFI
Projects Were Approved..c. ^^^
These incentives refer to the special ones that were granted to the
DFI firms on an individual basis, going beyond those that were
available prior to the approval of the DFI projects in question.
Incentive 1: Higher Tariffs on Competitive Imports

































Absolute Relative Adjusted Cumulative













Total 46 100.0 100.0
0. Unimportant 1. Of Little Importance 2. Quite Important
3. Very Important
Mean = 0.310
Standard Error = 0.110
Standard Deviation = 0.715
Mode = 0
Incentive 2: Tighter Quotas on Competitive Imports







































Standard Error = 0.204
Standard Deviation = 1.322
Mode = 0
Incentive 3; Tariff Reductions on Imports of Equipment








































Total 46 100.0 100.0
Same as above.
Mean = 0.976
Standard Error = 0.197
Standard Deviation = 1.278
Mode = 0
Incentive 4: Tariff Reductions on Imports of Raw Materials and Other
Intermediate Inputs- 59 -











































Total 46 100.0 100.0
Same as above.
Mean = 0.595
Standard Error = 0.167
Standard Deviation = 1.083
Mode = 0
Incentive 5^ Tax Rebates on Exports








Absolute Relative Adjusted Cumulative
































Standard Error = 0.160
Standard Deviation = 1.037
Mode = 0
Incentive 6: Investment Tax Credits




































Total 46 100.0 100.0
Same as above.
Mean = 0.643
Standard Error = 0.176
Standard Deviation = 1.144
Mode = 0- 61 -
Incentive 7: Accelerated Depreciation Allowances








































Standard Error == 0.108
46 100.0
Standard Deviation
Mode = = 0
100.0
= 0.701
Incentive 8; Government-supplied Infrastructure Facilities

























































Standard Error = 0.083
Standard Deviation = 0.537
Mode = 0
Incentive 9: Guaranteed Government Purchases of the DFI Projects'
Products








































Standard Deviation = 0.671
Mode = 0- 63 -
Incentive 10: Other Incentives




































Total 46 100.0 100.0
Same as above.
Mean = 0.143
Standard Error = 0.100
Standard Deviation = 0.647
Mode = 0
We can determine the relative importance of these ten Turkish
government DFI incentives by the ranking of their mean values:
Table 31 - Relative Importance of DFI Incentives
Incentive (Number) Mean
Tighter Quotas on 1.095
Competitive Imports (2)
Tariff Reductions on 0.976
Equipment Imports (3)
Tax Rebates on Exports (5) 0.738
Investment Tax Credits (6) 0.643
Level of Importance
Of Little Importance to
Quite Important




Tariff Reductions on 0.595
Intermediate Inputs (4)

















The obvious conclusion is that special Turkish government incentives
offered to DFI projects were on the whole of little importance,
if not unimportant. This is not at all surprising since Turkey has
never had an active official DFI promotion program and has never
offered foreign direct investors any special incentives. Law 6224,
in fact, states very clearly that DFI firms can be treated no diffe-
rently from all-Turkish firms. All the incentives received by DFI
firms could also be available to all-Turkish firms in their respective
sectors. Actually, during the interviews, many DFI firms complained
that they were discriminated against by the Turkish government in
the administration of special industrial investment incentives and
that this was in violation of Law 6224's equal treatment guarantee
for DFI firms. This complaint and the responses of government
officials will be examined in detail in the section dealing with the
expansion difficulties encountered by DFI firms.- 65 -
9. Was an Export Commitment Made to the Turkish Government When
DFI Project Was Approved?
Table 32 - Was an Export Commitment Made?
Absolute Relative Adjusted Cumulative











Total 46 100.0 100.0
Less than one third of the respondents had made an export commitment
when their DFI projects were approved. This relatively low ratio
reflects the fact in the 196O's and especially the 1950's, the
Turkish government did not as a rule demand many commitments or
impose many requirements in return for approving DFI applications.
In the 1970's, however, very few applications were approved without
some explicit conditions that had to be met by DFI firms during the
implementation of their authorization decrees.
Table 33 - Sectoral Frequencies of Export Commitment
Sector Export Commitment - Adjusted Frequency (%)




5. Transportation Vehicles and 42.9
Tractors
6. Non-electrical Machinery 0.0
and Metal Products






Export Commitment - Adjusted Frequency (%)
50.0
50.0
The relatively high frequencies of export commitment in sectors
5 and 8 are explained again in terms of the increasing concentration
of DFI activity in these sectors during the 1970's, which witnessed
the emergence of more demanding government DFI policies in Turkey.
10. Forms of Export Commitment






















































1. Minimum value of exports or minimum percentage of total sales
2. Minimum absolute level or minimum percentage of physical output
3. Minimum percentage of transferable profits
4. Minimum percentage of transferred profits with, a minimum
absolute level o£ physical output- 67 -
Table 34 Continued
5. Minimum percentage of the total foreign exchange payments
for imported inputs, compensation of foreign personnel and
license fees
During the interviews with Turkish DFI officials, the author was
told that when Turkey had begun to require export commitments from
DFI firms, it inadvertently gave them too much leeway in the choice
of what to export, by specifying their export commitments in
general value terms. Many firms were said to have exported products
unrelated to their own, even agricultural commodities, to meet
their export commitments. This practice was condemned by government
officials as one of the several instances in which DFI firms were
able to defeat the aims of Turkish DFI policies, by taking advantage
of the legal loopholes in their authorization decrees. As a result
of that experience, however, Turkey had lately begun to insist on
a DFI firm's own physical output form of export-commitment in most
cases. Therefore, the highest frequency of this form of export-
commitment reported by our questionnaire respondents reflects a
rather recent development. The sectoral frequencies of this form
of export-commitment, presented below, show its total absence from
some sectors and concentration in the others.
Table 35 - Export Commitment Based on Physical Output
Sector Adjusted Frequency of Export-Commitment
Based on DFI Firm's Own Physical Output(%)




5. Transportation Vehicles 33.3
and Tractors- 68 -
Table 35 Continued
Sector Adjusted Frequency of Export-Commitment
Based on DFI Firm's Own Physical Output(%)
6. Non-electrical Machinery 0.0
and Metal Products
7. Electrical Cables 100.0
8. Electrical Machinery 50.0
and Electronics
9. Building Materials 50.0
''* Investment Approval - Production Lag
Mean = 24.0 months (m) Standard Deviation = 27.0 m
Standard Error = 4.9 m
Minimum = - 1.0m Maximum = 154.0 m
Valid Observations = 31 Missing Observations = 15
There was according to the questionnaire results, a lag of 2 years
between the government's approval of a DFI project and its start
of production. The length of this lag could, of course, depend on
several factors and widely vary, as is shown below, among different
sectors.
Table 36 - Sectoral Investment Approval - Production Lags
Sector Investment Approval - Production Lag
Sectoral Mean (months) ^_____




5. Transportation Vehicles 49.0
and Tractors- 69 -
Table 36 Continued
Sector Investment Approval - Production Lag
Sectoral Mean (months)
6. Non-electrical Machinery 7.5
and Metal Products
7. Electrical Cables 18.7
8. Electrical Machinery 21.4
and Electronics
9. Building Materials 32.5
There could be several diverse technological and financial con-
straints on how rapidly a DFI project could be started and brought
to completion. It is obviously impossible to generalize about them.
There is one specific issue, however, that should be mentioned in
this connection.
During the interviews with the author, the DFI firms and government
officials blamed each other for delays between the approval of DFI
projects and their completion. The firms complained that after their
projects had been authorized by the Council of Ministers, they en-
countered bureaucratic obstacles in (1) obtaining special industrial
investment incentives from the Ministry of Industry and Technology,
(2) transfer approval of their incoming foreign funds from the
Ministry of Finance, and (3) customs clearance of their imported
capital equipment from the Ministry of Customs and Monopolies.
These obstacles created delays in implementing their authorization
decrees. And, in some cases they invalidated the initial feasibility
studies that justified the undertaking of their DFI projects, necessi-
tating revisions in their authorization decrees.- 70 -
The government officials, although not rejecting that there were
some administrative delays caused by lack of inter-ministry co-
ordination and inadequate manpower, claimed that the DFI firms them-
selves were sometimes guilty of deliberately delaying the start
and completion of their authorized projects. The firms were
accused of occasionally inventing excuses for delays so that they
could renegotiate their authorization decrees to obtain more
favorable terms from the government. Furthermore, some firms
were claimed to have obtained expansion or modernization autho-
rization decrees with no intention of implementing them as long
as they were earning oligopoly rents from contrived supply re-
strictions. Such firms also allegedly prevented others from seeking
authorization for new or expansion DFI projects, by virtue of
having obtained preemptive initial authorization in their respective
sectors, .
We believe that most post-decree delays in the start and completion
of DFI projects could not have been engineered, that is, caused
deliberately, by either the government officials or the firms them-
selves. Most post-authorization bureaucratic obstacles appeared to
have resulted from the lack of inter-ministry coordination and the
typical general slowness of the Turkish bureaucracy. On the other
hand, although a few firms might have dragged their feet in imple-
menting their decrees for whatever reasons, most of them seemed to
have done their best to start and complete the projects for which
they had received authorization. In short, neither the DFI firms
nor the government officials had much justification for their
mutual accusations. The basic problem was, of course, again the lack
of mutual trust and effective communication between the two sides.- 71 -
12. Was Additional Productive Capacity Built Since the Initial
Capacity Went into Production?
Table 37 - Was Additional Capacity Built?
Absolute Relative Adjusted Cumulative




















Four out of five respondents reported increasing their productive
capacities beyond the initial levels authorized by their founding
decrees. In other words, most of the DFI firms responding had grown,
whether at the rate they wished to or not, since coming into
existence. Below we present the sectoral frequencies of affirmative
replies to the additional capacity question:
Table 38 - Additional Capacity Was Built
Sector



















Sector Additional Capacity Was Built
Adjusted Frequency (%)
8. Electrical Machinery 80.0
and Electronics
9. Building Materials 100.0
We see that at least two out of three respondents in each sector
reported building additional capacity. The variation of the sectoral
frequencies could have been due to several different causes, among
them, obviously, the length of time firms in individual sectors
have been in existence. Older firms would be expected to have built
additional capacity with higher frequency than younger firms.
13. Additional Capacity Built as a Percentage of Initial Capacity
Mean = 299.6 Standard Deviation = 357.4
Standard Error = 62.2
Minimum = 10.0 Maximum = 2000.0
Valid Observations = 33 Missing Observations = 13
The average additional capacity built appears to have been triple
the initial level, with significant variation among the individual
respondents. Again, we would expect older firms to have built
relatively more additional capacity than younger firms, but obvious-
ly this expectation would be stronger on an intrasectoral basis
than on an intersectoral one. We now turn to the intersectoral
variation in the percentages of additional capacity built:- 73 -
Table 39 - Sectoral Additional Capacities
Sector Additional Capacity Built as a Per-
centage of Initial Capacity




5. Transportation Vehicles 98.0
and Tractors
6. Non-electrical Machinery 183.3
and Metal Products
7. Electrical Cables 150.0
8. Electrical Machinery 308.8
and Electronics
9. Building Materials 360.0
The relatively very high rate of expansion in Sector 1 is that of
a single respondent, which was one of the oldest DFI firms in
Turkey. The lowest rate of expansion shown by Sector 5 is most
likely due to the fact that most of its respondents were among the
youngest DFI firms in the country. A thorough explanation of the
intersectoral variation of capacity expansion rates requires detailed
analyses of the individual sectors, which will not be attempted here.
14. Evaluation of Recent Rate of Capacity Expansion in Light of
Present Demand
DFI firms were asked to evaluate their receit rates of capacity
expansion in light of the present demand for their products. It
should be mentioned that during the period this research was carried
out Turkey was nearing international bankruptcy. No legal transfers
of foreign exchange for intermediate input or equipment spare parts
imports were feasible for most private manufacturing firms in the
country, and the economy's real rate of growth had sharply dropped- 74 -
to about 2 per cent per annum. Many manufacturing firms, among them
several DFI firms, were forced to operate at less than 50 per cent
capacity. Consequently, the results of DFI firms' own evaluation
of their expansion rates below should be interpreted against this
relatively dismal background.

































Two thirds of the respondents considered their recent expansion
rates as "too low". Not a single one regarded its rate of expansion
as "too high". This outcome is rather surprising, given the de-
terioration in Turkey's DFI environment, coupled with the over-all
worsening of economic conditions in the country that coincided with
the duration of our investigation.
During the interviews, however, namy DFI executives expressed their
optimistic belief that Turkey's international bankruptcy would
not be allowed by the Western industrialized countries to go too far
in damaging Turkish industrialization prospects and thereby pushing
Turkey toward severing its political and military alliance with the
West. They argued that the West could not afford for strategic reasons
to let Turkey go down the drain, and therefore, it would before long
bail the "Sick Man of Europe" out once more, as it had done earlier
in 1958. Some also speculated that Turkey might even be persuaded- 75 -
or forced into assigning a far bigger role to DFI in its future
industrialization efforts. In short, the DFI firms interviewed
were on the whole bullish about their long-term presence in Turkey,
despite the fact that the current conditions they faced were quite
discouraging. Several foreign managers of DFI firms did confess,
however, that their positive views were not shared by their parent-
firm executives who from outside viewed Turkey as a lost cause.





Too low 100.0 100.0 50.0 80.0 35.7 75.0 0.0 66.7 0.0
About right 0.0 0.0 50.0 20.0 14.3 25.0 100.0 33.3 100.0
Too high 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
*
1. Food and Beverages 2. Rubber 3. Chemicals 4. Pharmaceuticals
5. Transportation Vehicles and Tractors 6. Non-electrical Machinery
Products 7. Electrical Cables 8. Electrical Machinery and
Electronics 9. Building Materials
In all but sectors 7 and 9, at least one out of two respondents
considered their rates of capacity increases as "too low'.' In the
next section, attention turns to the reasons offered by DFI firms
that regarded their present capacity levels as insufficient.- 76 -
15. Reasons for Too Low Rates of Capacity Expansion
Lew Capaity Reason ]: Underestimation of the Rate of Increase in
Demand.













































0. Unimportant 1. Of Little Importance 2. Quite Important
3. Very Important
Mean = 0.571
Standard Error = 0.149
Standard Deviation = 0.790
Mode = 0
Low Capacity Reason 2: Restrictions Placed on Expansion by the
Turkish Government's DFI Licensing Process- 77 -
Table 43 - Low Capacity Reason 2
Code* Absolute Relative Adjusted Cumulative





































Standard Error = 0.050
Standard Deviation = 0.262
Mode = 3
Low Capacity Reason 3: Difficulties in Financing Capacity Expansion
Table 44 T LOW Capacity Reason 3
Code Absolute Relative Adjusted Cumulative











































Standard Error = 0.222
Stai dard Deviation = 1.175
Mode = 0
Low Capacity Reason 4; Difficulties in Importing Capital Goods Due
to the Turkish Government's Restrictions on
Foreign Exchange














































Standard Error = 0.233
Standard Deviation = 1.232
Mode = 3- 79 -
Low Capacity Reason 5: Shortages of Qualified Manpower




















































Standard Error = 0.167
Standard Deviation = 0.881
Mode = 0
Low Capacity Reason 6: Other Reasons
Table 47 - Low Capacity Reasons 6
Code Absolute Relative Adjusted Cumulative

















































Standard Error = 0.237
Standard Deviation = 1.254
Mode = 0
In terms of their relative levels of importance, the six low
capacity reasons yield the following ranking:
Table 48 - Relative Importance of Low Capacity Reasons
Low Capacity Reason (Number) Mean Value
Government DFI licensing 2.929
restrictions on expansion (2)
Government restrictions on 2.036
foreign exchange transfers
for capital goods (4)
Financing difficulties (3) 1.250
Other reasons (6) 0.643
Underestimation of the rate 0.571
of increase in demand (})








little importance- 31 -
What emerges is that by far the most serious constraint on capacity
expansions of the respondents was the Turkish government's DFI
licensing restrictions. This was a direct and DFI-firm specific
official constraint. The next most important and also official
constraint, government restrictions on foreign exchange transfers
for capital goods, was only partially direct and BFI firm specific.
In other words, not all such foreign exchange transfer restrictions
were applied to only the DFI firms. All-Turkish firms, too, faced
them, given Turkey's pervasive direct government controls on all
types of foreign exchange transfers.
Before we review the interview results concerning the complaints
of DFI firms in the general area of capacity expansion, and the
responses of government officials, we note belcw the near unanimity
among sectors, in which respondents reported insufficient capacity,
about the highest relative importance of the DFI licensing process
as a reason for insufficient capacity levels:
















6. Non-electrical Machinery 3,00 " " "
and Metal Products
7. Electrical Cables * *
8. Electrical Machinery 2.667 Quite important to
and Electronics very important
9. Building Materials * *
*
Not applicable since all respondents in the sector considered their
rates of capacity expansion as "about right".- 82 -
A. The Controversy on Capacity Expansion
DFI firms complained that they found it too difficult to expand
because of the various official restrictions imposed on their
activities. Many argued that they could not even maintain their
existing productive capacities. They were being deliberately
run into the ground. They felt that they were discriminated
against by the Turkish government vis-a-vis their all-Turkish
rivals despite the provision for equal treatment contained in
Law 6224.
An all-Turkish firm needed no permission from the government in
order to.increase its productive capacity but a DFI firm had to
get a new decree, i.e. an investment license. Even if a DFI firm
could finance its expansion project out of its non-remitted earnings
or bring in additional capital from abroad, with no need for
domestic external financing, it still found it extremely hard to
obtain an expansion decree.
In fact, the more profitable it was, and therefore, the more
able to finance its expansion internally, the greater became the
opposition of the government to its growth. The government disliked
highly profitable DFI firms and treated them as if they owed their
success to objectionable means of doing business. This attitude of
the government forced some DFI firms deliberately to conceal their
profitability in order to avoid unfriendly measures that might -
be taken to punish them for being too profitable. For example, the
more profitable a DFI firm was, the more frequently it was likely
to be audited by the Ministry of Finance, increasing the chance
that some of its transferable profits would be blocked at the
Central Bank.
Usually when a DFI firm applied for an expansion decree, the govern-
ment contronted it with various drastic and unreasonable changes- 83 -
in its old decrees as a condition for permitting it to expand.
Such changes could involve a reduction in the foreign equity
share, a new or higher export commitment, a decrease or elimi-
nation of the technology transfer payments to the foreign parent
firm, and the like. Sometimes the government's conditions for
accepting the expansion application were so unfavorable to a
DFI firm that it preferred to withdraw its application. In fact,
the government resorted to this tactic of demanding what it
knew would be hard or impossible to accept revisions in a firm's
old decrees, whenever the firm requested a new decree for a merely
operational objective, such as changing its name, as well as for
an expansion project. Furthermore, even if a firm did not offer the
government an opportunity for revising its old decrees by apply-
ing for a new decree, the government occasionally declared that
they had been revised unilaterally. Then the firm could either
accept this fait accompli or take the government to Danistay,
the High Turkish Court, for a prolonged litigation.
Some firms, fully aware of the difficulty if not impossibility
of obtaining expansion decrees, had increased their productive
capacities stealthily. They argued that there was no choice if
they were to stay alive. They had to grow with the market or fall
by the wayside. Eventually the government would find out about
their unauthorized expansions and decide to crack down-. But then
the government itself would be presented with a fait accompli
and forced to come to terms with them. In such cases, the firms
and the government entered into a bargaining. That resulted in
The government could, of course, accuse them of illegal conduct and
thereby annul their decrees, forcing them to shut down. But this
alternative, which incidentally the government had never chosen, would
create serious problems such as supply shortages and unemployment of
industrial workers with political clout.- 84 -
the issuance of decrees, containing certain concessions by
the firms, declaring their de facto expansion de jure, and
authorizing suitable increases in their nominal capitals to
match the already accomplished increases in their fixed assets.
During the bargaining, however, the government occasionally
blocked the transferable profits of the foreign partners,
attributable to the unauthorized investments.
Several of the firms that had confronted the government with
de facto increases in their capacities argued that modernization
of their facilities, rather than just a straightforward expansion
with old technology, accounted for their higher capacity levels.
In fact, they had tried to convince the government that the gradual
replacement of old plant and equipment as a result of the normal
depreciation process, necessarily led to increases in productivity
and this should not be considered as unauthorized expansion.
It should be noted, however, that DFI firms that wished to expand
either legally or illegally, or simply to replace their old plant
and equipment, could not easily obtain the necessary capital goods.
First, all imports of capital goods were subject to government
licensing and/or required foreign exchange allocation. Since at
least 1973, the National Annual Economic Programs had contained
a discriminatory provision concerning imports of producers'
goods: The foreign exchange allocations by the Ministry of
Commerce for the imports of investment goods by, the private
sector had been restricted for DFI firms only to those requests
that did non enable them to increase their capacity and production.
This was another instance of discrimination against DFI firms,
contrary to Law 6224, which provided for equal treatment for
all firms operating in the country.
Often the firms were able to increase their nominal capitals by dipping
into their ordinary and extraordinary reserves,, which they had accumulated
during the expansion of their productive capacities. So, only a shifting
around of internal funds in their balance sheets was involved in this process.- 85 -
Secondly, even if a DFI firm applied for no foreign exchange
allocation and simply wanted permission to import investment
goods not produced in Turkey, by financing them out of its own
or parent's foreign exchange credits, it found it rather
difficult to obtain such permission from the government. Even
when it had already obtained an expansion decree, it took too
long first to get an import license and then to clear the im-
ported goods through the Turkish customs. Its expansion decree
did not entitle it automatically to the several possible industrial
investment incentives that were administered by the Ministry of
Industry and Technology. Among these incentives were total or
partial exemption from customs duties and the payment of these
duties on installment. And, it could not apply for any of these
incentives, before obtaining an expansion decree.
Several firms, faced with the various problems in importing capital
goods, had initiated their local production. They had either
produced them themselves or contracted out their separate components
to different local producers after providing them with the necessary
blue-prints and technical assistance. These firms stated that
their forced self-sufficiency had decreased their efficiency and
product quality, but enabled them at least to survive. Some firms
had made deals with all-Turkish firms that imported the investment
goods needed, in their own names, but later sold them as used
equipment to these DFI firms at a premium.
Concerning the domestic financing of a DFI firm's investment
expenditures there were three complaints:
(1) As regards new or expansion projects, the Ministry of Finance
discriminated against DFI firms in the distribution of invest-
ment tax credits, which were among the several industrial
investment incentives administered by the Ministry of Industry
and Technology. The Ministry of Finance restricted the benefits
DFI firms could derive from these credits by tying them to
the level of local equity participation.- 86 -
(2) The Ministry of Finance severely restricted the allocation
of depreciation funds for the replacement of old equipment.
Ignoring such important factors as world-wide inflation,
rapid technological progress and steady erosion in the
relative value of the Turkish lira, that led to significant
increases in the lira prices of new equipment, the Ministry
of Finance insisted that old equipment be replaced at the
old foreign book-value prices and at the old foreign exchange
rates, which was clearly an impossible task to accomplish.
DFI firms argued that this restriction, if it were to be
effectively implemented, would surely run them into the
ground. All-Turkish firms did not face this restriction and
were, therefore, at a distinct advantage vis-a-vis their
rivals with foreign equity participation.
(3) DFI firms found it more difficult to get loans- from Turkish
banks than did all-Turkish firms because the government
frowned on banks that financed DFI firms. This was claimed
to be yet another instance of discrimination against DFI firms,
in violation of Law 6224.
Altogether there seemed to be sufficient evidence that the several
official obstacles DFI firms encountered in their efforts to
expand, to grow with their markets, more than just eroded their
international economic edge over their all-Turkish rivals. They
were so detrimental that several DFI firms, especially after
the mid-1970's, had been forced on this account, to rid themselves
of their "foreigner" liability, their "hunchback" as one firm
put it. Most of them had chosen to go all-Turkish by having the
local partners buy out the foreign partners, but maintain close
technological and business ties between them. The others had
set up all-Turkish firms as extensions (and competitors!) of
themselves in order to take unfettered advantage of the market
growth, especially in the production of newer products with- 87 -
higher profit margins which a DFI firm would not be easily
allowed to produce. Such all-Turkish extensions of DFI firms
had usually the same access to the foreign parents' knowhow,
which they paid for often by means of concealed transactions.
These transactions had usually involved sufficiently high
mark-ups on intermediate inputs imported directly or indirectly
from the foreign parents. This practice of spinning off all-Turkish
extensions was being considered by a number of DFI firms that
were pessimistic about their short- and medium-term growth
prospects but wished to maintain their presence in Turkey,
hoping for possible long-term improvements in the DFI climate.
These complaints of DFI firms were discussed by the author with
several government officials who were asked to state their views
on the matter. Their responses follow.
The State Planning Organization (SPO) denied that it was against
the grow,th of DFI firms, especially since most of them were
actually so small by international standards and unable to exploit
fully the available economies of scale in production. In fact, it
had itself forced some of them to increase their capacities to
meet its minimum scale requirements.
Concerning this complaint, the SPO officials made the following
remarks:
(1) Any DFI firm that wished to increase its capacity of production
had also to increase its nominal capital. And, to increase
its nominal capital it had to obtain a new decree from the
Council of Ministers. That was the law, i.e. Law 6224. The
SPO had to implement the law and the firms had to obey it,
unless and until the law could be revised to drop the
decree requirement for expansion projects.- 88 -
(2) The SPO had to keep track of sectoral capacity levels in
order to plan the growth of Turkish manufacturing sector
by sector. Keeping track of sectoral capacity levels re-
quired information on individual firms' capacities. Although
the SPO was not authorized by law to decide and control the
capacities of private all-Turkish firms directly, it could
do this for DFI firms. It regarded this as an important
instrument of planning and was unwilling to give it up so
that DFI firms could expand at will without its permission.
But, the SPO emphasized, in reality, instead of standing in
the way of DFI firms that wanted to expand their production,
it often had to demand that DFI firms increase their capa-
cities above certain minimum levels. Frequently, firms
were reluctant to comply with its demand in order not to
reduce their excessive profits and resorted to all sorts of
delaying tactics that were frustrating to the SPO and harmful
to the national interest.
(3) Although the SPO had no general opposition to expansion of
DFI firms, it reserved judgment on the desirability of ex-
pansion for particular projects of individual DFI firms.The
net benefits Turkey could derive from the presence of a given
DFI firm changed over time. In other words, the social pro-
fitability of an on-going enterprise, as estimated by the SPO,
might not be as significant later in its life as in its
earlier years. Therefore, its continuous expansion might become
for Turkey less and less desirable and eventually not desirable
at all. The SPO would keep close watch on every DFI firm and
allow it to continue its expansion in a given direction until
its social profitability was exhausted.
Furthermore, the SPO believed that whenever, in a given sector,
increased production could be provided by the expansion of all-
Turkish firms, they should be given priority over their DFI
competitors. The social profitability of such an expansion was- 89 -
higher than that of DFI firms, the SPO claimed. When the SPO
was asked whether this did not violate the no-discrimination
(between all-Turkish and DFI firms) provision of Law 6224,
it replied in the negative. It argued that since according to
Law 6224 (Article 1 - Clause a) any DFI firm could be allowed
to expand as long as such an expansion tended "to promote the
economic development of the country", it was authorized to stop
that firm's expansion whenever the country's economic development
could be better served by the expansion of all-Turkish firms.
This entailed no discrimination for its own sake, the SPO
asserted, and there could be no question that the country always
benefited more from the expansion of all-Turkish firms than that
of DFI firms.
Neither the Ministry of Commerce nor the Ministry of Finance
admitted to being opposed in general to the expansion of DFI firms.
The DFI Divisions of both ministries argued, as did that of the
SPO, that each individual case had to be and was judged separately
and strictly on its own merits. No generalization could or should
be made.
The Ministry of Commerce was against unilateral revision of old
decrees (and did not approve of the SPO's occasional attempts at
that) but believed that it was perfectly reasonable for the Turkish
government to ask for such revision and then bargain for it with
a DFI firm that had applied for an expansion decree. That was the
only legal way open to the government to make up for its past
bargaining weaknesses and mistakes with that firm. Besides, over
time economic and political conditions of the country changed
and necessitated a re-evaluation of each on-going DFI enterprise.
Even if initially Turkey had bargained effectively with the foreign
investors and received the best possible terms from them for that
time, later no new terms might be needed to justify their continued
presence in the country. If they did not wish to accept Turkey's
new terms as a condition for their expanded activities, they were- 90 -
free to withdraw their expansion applications or even pull
out of Turkey completely.
DFI officials of the SPO, the Ministries of Commerce and
Finance all rejected the allegation that they did not approve
of and harassed highly profitable DFI firms. They claimed that
such firms themselves often asked for trouble by becoming unruly.
Feeling overconfident, these firms resisted making the changes
stipulated in their decrees, e.g. decreasing the equity share
of the foreign partners, in a manner satisfactory to the govern-
ment. Then the government was forced to press them hard to get
its demands satisfied. But, these officials argued, they did
not pick on a firm just because it was a highly profitable one.
They also noted that a DFI decree by itself could not entitle a
firm to any of the industrial investment incentives administered
2 by the Ministry of Industry and Technology. The SPO officials
rejected that ministry's offer to get involved in DFI decisions
in the pre-decree stage as a solution, and instead, wished to
regain the SPO's authority from that ministry to administer the
investment incentives themselves. The Ministry of Finance officials
thought that DFI firms would be the losers from getting yet another
E.g., they insisted on selling part of their foreign equity not to
those Turkish interests, such as a State Economic Enterprise, acceptable
to the government, but to certain Turkish investors whom the government
did not approve of.
2
Interestingly, the chief architect and administrator of the industrial
investment incentives scheme in the Ministry of Industry and Technology,
believed that a DFI decree should entitle a firm to receive such incen-
tives and that his ministry, too, should be involved in DFI decision-
making of the government to remedy this deficiency.- 91 -
government agency, i.e. the Ministry of Industry and Technology,
involved in (pre-decree) DFI decisions, because that would only
increase the inter-agency squabbling and slow down further the
processing of DFI applications. DFI firms were relatively better
off facing the uncertainty whether they would receive all or any
of the investment incentives that they might have assumed in
their feasibility studies.
The Ministry of Finance DFI officials stated that their Ministry's
Taxation Department was responsible for the ruling on the restricted
distribution of investment tax credits to DFI firms. They reasoned
that in the absence of the appropriate taxation treaties between
Turkey and DFI source-countries, any tax credits Turkey granted
to foreign investors might be taxed instead by their source-
countries, doing neither Turkey nor the foreign investors themselves
any good.
As regards the complaint about insufficient depreciation allowances,
these officials stated that this, too, concerned the Taxation Depart-
ment. They argued, however, that this justified complaint could be
heard from all-Turkish firms as well. The Turkish tax system had
to be reformed to enable all firms to use inflation-accounting and
thereby take advantage of accelerated depreciation necessitated by
ever-increasing inflation. There was claimed to be no discrimination
against DEI firms with respect to this serious problem.
It should again be noted that the Ministry of Industry and Technology was
critical of this ruling because it was an interference in its administra-
tion of the investment incentives and an unjust treatment of DFI firms as
well.
2
The author was unable to pursue this matter further by interviewing the
Taxation Department officials who could not be approached.- 92 -
Finally, these same officials denied that there had been any
systematic attempt on the government's part to restrict domestic
bank credits to DFI firms. If there had indeed been any dis-
crimination by domestic banks against DFI firms, its real cause
should be sought in the ownership structure of Turkish banking.
They speculated that since the larger private commercial banks
were controlled by the larger Turkish private industrial con-
glomerates, the so-called Holdings, they might discriminate
against those DFI firms in which they held no equity. This
speculation appeared to lack credibility, however, because almost
all the important DFI joint-ventures in Turkey had as partners
one of those Holdings, each of which controlled one of the larger
private commercial banks.
In connection with this issue, it should be noted that according
to the research director of the Turkish Industrial Development
Bank, itself a DFI firm, a joint-venture with the International
Finance Corporation, his bank could finance the investment projects
of all-Turkish firms only, as a result of government pressure.
Furthermore, the SPO officials were emphatic about the necessity
of limiting the access of DFI firms to domestic sources of finance.
These officials argued that although these firms had been expected
to alleviate the country's savings and foreign-exchange gaps by
bringing in foreign credits, which they could get far more easily
than all-Turkish firms, they had instead resorted to local
borrowing whenever they could, and thereby decreased the availa-
bility of domestic funds to all-Turkish firms. DFI firms were
claimed to find it easier than their all-Turkish competitors to
get local financing from Turkish banks, on the basis of their
larger size, higher profitability and international prestige.
The SPO believed that contrary to the complaint of DFI firms
about discriminatory restrictions on their local borrowing, all-
Turkish firms were the ones that were actually discriminated against
by the banks. It was this discrimination that the governmentobjected to and tried to eliminate.
Our conclusion on this important issue of capacity expansion
is that DFI firms were on the whole discriminated against by
the government, which appeared to fear that their increasing
sizes might enable them to become too powerful economically
and politically. This underlying fear of domination by large
foreign business interests on the part of Turkish bureaucracy
has been and will continue to be a serious obstacle to greater
penetration of Turkish manufacturing by DFI.
16. What Was the Initial Estimate of the Length of Time Necessary
to Repatriate the Parent Firm's Original Imported Capital
During the First Year of Operation?
Mean = 7.6 years (y) Standard Deviation = 3.9 y
Standard Error = 0.8 y
Minimum = 3.0 y Maximum = 20.0 y
Valid Observations = 25 Missing Observations = 21
Most of the DFI firms who could not response to this question indi-
cated that no such estimate had been made. The above average
original foreign capital pay-back period initial estimate of almost
3 years is based on responses of old as well as young firms.Undoubtedly,
an individual DFI firm's estimate would have depended on, among other
things, the Turkish DFI climate of the time during which it had been
established, as well as the sector to which it had belonged. "
The serious nature of this issue of local financing might be better under-
stood if it is kept in mind that Turkey had no national money or capital
markets to speak of. Almost all local business borrowing, short-, medium-
and long-term, was from the banks.- 94 -
Table 50 - Initial Estimate of Original Imported Foreign Capital
Pay-Back Period
Sector Initial Estimate of Original Imported
Foreign Capital Fay-Back Period -
Mean (years)
1. Food and Beverages 6.0
2. Rubber Not available
3. Chemicals 5.5
4. Pharmaceuticals 11.0
5. Transportation Vehicles 5.2
and Tractors
6. Non-electrical Machinery 7.0
and Metal Products
7. Electrical Cables 10.0
8. Electrical Machinery and 0.1
Electronics
9. Building Materials 7.5
We see that sectors 4 and 7 had relatively long pay-back period
initial estimates. Now, both these sectors consisted of relatively
old DFI firms. Therefore, it would appear rather implausible to
attribute their longer than average estimates to worsening of the
Turkish DFI climate over time. Instead, their sectoral characteristics
would seem to have been influential.
17. Has the Parent Firm's Original Imported Capital Been Already
Completely Repatriated?
Table 51 - Is the Original Imported Capital Fully Paid-back?
Absolute Relative Adjusted Cumulative







































Slightly less than 50 per cent of the respondents' parent firms'
original imported capital had already been completely paid back.
Of course, the answer to this question would have depended first
of all oh the age as well as the growth of a DFI firm. The older
it was and the faster it had grown since its establishment, the
more likely that it would have answered the question affirmatively.
18. What Is the Present Estimate of the Length of Time Necessary to
Repatriate the Parent Firm's Original Imported Capital If It
Has Not Yet Been Repatriated?
Mean = 13.6 years (y) Standard Deviation = 7.8 y
Standard Error =2.1
Minimum = 3.0 y Maximum = 30.0 y
Valid Observations = 14 Missing Observations = 32
Only about two thirds of the respondents who answered the previous
question negatively responded to this question. We note that this
average present original foreign capital pay-back period estimate
of almost 14 years is considerably longer than the initial estimate
of almost 8 years. As was mentioned by DFI firms during the inter-
views, this lengthening of the original foreign capital pay-back
period estimate should be attributed to the deterioration of the
Turkish DFI climate recently.- 96 -
Table 52 - Present Estimates of Original Imported Capital
Payback Periods
Sector
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We observe that in sector 4, the present estimate of the original
foreign capital pay-back period is more than double the initial
estimate. The author is rather skeptical at this time, however, that
the original foreign capital of any pharmaceutical DFI firm had not
yet been repatriated when his questionnaire was answered. We hope to
investigate this issue later in a separate sectoral study.
In sector 5, the present estimate is more than triple the initial
estimate, indicating a rather deep pessimism of the DFI firms pro-
ducing transportation vehicles and tractors about their future, based
on the recent deterioration of the Turkish DFI climate. In sectors 6
and 7, too, the present estimates are longer than the initial esti-
mates, but not so strikingly. In sector 8, however, the present esti-
mate is shorter than the initial estimate, raising the obvious and
interesting question, which will be investigated later in a separate
sectoral study, as to why.- 97
19. What Has Been the Parent Firm's Rate of Return (Repatriated
Earnings as a Percentage of,the Parent Firm's Original
Imported Capital) during 1970 - 1977?
It should first be mentioned that several DFI firms, especially
the relatively old ones that had also grown considerably since
their founding, objected to the formulation of this question. They
argued that expressing the parent firm's annual rate of return in
terms of annual repatriated earnings in current Turkish liras would
give a misleading picture of the parent firm's gains. These gains
would be grossly exaggerated for two reasons: (1) Inflation in
Turkey and elsewhere reduced the real foreign currency value of
their current repatriated earnings drastically. Inflation in Turkey
occurred at a higher rate than in their parent firm countries,
forcing the Turkish lira's periodic depreciations. Furthermore, in-
flation in their parent firm countries eroded the purchasing power
of their earnings after they had been transferred out of Turkey.
(2) The current annual repatriated earnings should not be attributed
to the original imported capital exclusively because they also in-
cluded the later contributions of the parent firm to the DFI firm
in terms of additional capital imports and/or reinvested earnings.
These DFI firms feared that any exaggeration of the parent firm
gains could be easily used against them by anti-DFI forces in
Turkey. Consequently, they declined to answer the question as it was
formulated in the questionnaire. Nevertheless, some of them answered
the question by reformulating it so that the parent firm's annual
rate of return expressed the current repatriated earnings as a per-
centage of the current, i.e. cumulative capital base of the parent
in the DFI firm.
Therefore, our figures on the parent firm rates of return should be
interpreted cautiously by taking into account the qualifications
of our respondents. They can not serve as very reliable indices of
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1. Food and Beverages 2. Rubber 3. Chemicals 4. Pharmaceuticals
5. Transportation vehicles and tractors 6. Non-electrical machinery and metal products
7. Electrical cables 8. Electrical machinery and electronics 9. Building materials- 100 -
unreliability is not, however, only a result of their tendency
to exaggerate parent firm gains for the two reasons stated earlier.
They also fail to account for the fact that not all parent firms
gains were derived from official repatriated earnings proper. In
fact, several DFI firms reported that they had repatriated offi-
cially no earnings whatsoever during 1970-77 or for even longer
periods. As will be discussed later, many DFI firms relied instead
on sufficiently high mark-ups on the intermediate input imports from
their parent firm profits. In other words, transfer pricing was
their either preferred or feasible means of enabling their parents
to share in their profits. They did not, of course, use explicitly
the term "transfer pricing", with its well-known anti-multinational
corporation connotation, to describe their practice. They referred
instead to the satisfaction of their parents with being able to find
a market in Turkey for products that were imported as their inter-
mediate inputs from their parents.
With the above reservations in mind, we now turn to the examination
of our estimates on parent firm average rates of return. The annual
mean rates of return appear to have been rather steady during 1970-77,
averaging about 23 per cent for this eight-year period. This figure
implies a less than five-year pay-back period for parent firm's
original imported capital, which is shorter than both the initial
and present pay-back period estimates of about 8 years and 14 years,
respectively, that were presented earlier. Then the conclusion is
that on the whole our respondents exaggerated significantly their
estimates of the pay-back period.
There was considerable variation around the mean rates of return,
between a minimum of 0 and a maximum of more than 100 per cent, for
each year during 1970-77 and for the eight-year period as a whole.
In order to inquire into at least some of the reasons for such
variation, it might be useful to look at the sectoral average parent
firm rates of return which are presented below.- 101 -
There are, indeed, very sharp differences among the nine sectors
in their average parent firm rates of return. Sector 6 stands out
very clearly as the one with by far the highest rate of return,
which exceeded 100 per cent every year during 1972-77 and also
for the period 1970-77 as a whole. On the other extreme, sector 5
had by far the lowest rate of return among all sectors every year
as well as for the period 1970-77 as a whole. Our hypothesis, which
we hope to test in a later paper after processing the questionnaire
data on imports of DFI firms, is that the above sectoral differences
in the parent firm rates of return are correlated with their rela-
tive levels of dependence on intermediate inputs imports from
parent firms. We would expect sectors with higher levels of such
dependence to show lower parent firm rates of return, thanks to a
broader scope for transfer-pricing.
A. The Controversy on Transferable Profits
As regards transferable profits, which when actually transferred
would form the basis of the above estimates of the average parent
rates of return, DFI firms expressed the following grievance
during the interviews:
Auditors from the Ministry of Finance compared the net value of
the fixed assets with the paid-up capital in the balance sheet
of a DFI firm. If the former exceeded the latter, they regarded
the difference as unauthorized investment. Then the transferable
profit of the foreign partner attributable to that difference
was blocked at the Central Bank by the Ministry of Finance.
The procedure used by the auditors in their calculations was
not revealed to the DFI firms themselves. It seemed to vary from
auditor to auditor. Also, the strictness with which the firms
were subjected to this type of auditing varied from firm to firm
and time to time. The more profitable a firm was, however, the- 102 -
more likely it was to face such an auditing and to be charged
with unauthorized investment.
The majority of the firms covered by this study had faced such
an audit at one time or another. Several had had parts of their
transferable profits blocked. Some had accepted this result,
believing that it would be futile to challenge the Ministry of
Finance in Turkish courts. Others, however, had taken their
cases to Danistay, the High Turkish Court, which took years to
reach a decision. While the case was tried, the blockage remained
in effect. A few firms had chosen to deal with this problem
illegally, i.e. by bribing the Ministry of Finance auditors for
a favorable report. They justified their conduct by arguing that
the Turkish government itself resorted to illegal means of re-
stricting, their activities and it was hopeless for a DFI firm
to protect its interests in Turkey through legal channels only.
This was, of course, the same argument that several DFI firms
presented in justification of their other types of illegal, or
at least questionable conduct.
When questioned by the author, officials of the Ministry of
Commerce and the SPO, acknowledging the seriousness of this issue,
noted that they had nothing to do with it. Only the Ministry of
Finance was said to be involved.
In the Ministry of Finance itself, the Foreign Capital Movements
Department (which was responsible for the over-all financial super-
vision of DFI firms) found the firms justified in their complaint
as far as the inconsistency of the auditing procedure was con-
cerned. It was accepted that there had been no explicitly for-
mulated and consistently applied implementation code, although
there ought to have been one. The lack of such a code was explained
in terms of: (1) the high turnover among the Ministry of Finance
auditors and (2) each case being a little special and requiring- 103 -
an individual treatment that could not be provided by a
uniform procedure.
Furthermore, it was pointed out that the Ministry of Finance
auditors who.went over the books of DFI firms were not from the
Foreign Capital Movements Department. They were from the
Taxation Department and were thus independent of the Foreign
Capital Movements Department which had the over-all financial
regulatory responsibility for DFI firms. The Foreign Capital
Movements Department argued that it had no authority to request
the formulation of a written public code and its consistent
application from the auditors of the Taxation Department.
It was believed that these auditors, who were mostly fresh
university graduates, approached their task of going over the
books of DFI firms with a general anti-DFI attitude acquired
during their studies and a desire to show their colleagues and
superiors their toughness toward foreign firms. Most of these
auditors eventually transferred to other government jobs with
promotion or resigned to accept executive positions in the private
sector. Their anti-DFI attitudes appeared often to mellow or
disappear afterwards. It appeared to us that DFI firms were quite
justified in their grievance. Their harassment by Ministry of
Finance auditors, whether deliberate or not, increased their
reluctance to show official transferable profits subject to
possible blockage at the Central Bank. Consequently, they had
stronger preference for channelling parent firm gains via transfers
pricing, i.e. sufficiently high mark-ups on imports of inter-
mediate inputs, whenever possible.
Attention turns now to our estimates of rates of return for all,
Turkish as well as foreign, investors in DFI firms. These rates of
return were expressed in three alternative terms: (1) Earnings
before interest and income tax as a percentage of total assets,- 104 -
(2) earnings before income tax as a percentage of total equity,
and (3) earnings after income tax as a percentage of total
equity.
20. What Has Been the DFI Firm's Rate of Return in Terms of Earnings
before Interest and Income Tax as a Percentage of Total Assets
during 1970-77?
The average annual gross rate of return on total assets appears to
have increased until 1974 and then declined, with a value of about
20 per cent for the period 1970-77 as a whole. Presently we have
no plausible explanation for this trend. The range of this rate,
indicated by its minimum and maximum values, was rather wide, for
both each year and the eight-year period as a whole. We now look at
the sectoral differences in this rate, leaving aside the question
of its relative level in comparison with the rate for all, ie.
all-Turkish as well as DFI firms in Turkish manufacturing, which
we hope to answer in a later stage of our work.
An interesting pattern of sectoral differences for 1970-77 in the
estimated annual gross rates of return on total assets emerges,
Sector 2 and 9 show the highest returns, which are about 70 per
cent higher than that for all sectors combined. Sectors 1, 3 and
7, too, have above average returns but by a smaller margin. The
remaining sectors, i.e. sectors 4, 5, 6, and 8 appear to suffer
from similar below average returns by significant margins. The
sources of these differences will be investigated in detailed sectoral
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1. Food and beverages 2. Rubber 3. Chemicals 4. Pharmaceuticals
5. Transportation vehicles and tractors 6. Non-electrical machinery and metal products
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21. What Has Been the DFI Firm's Rate of Return in Terms of Earnings
before Income Tax as a Percentage of Total Equity during 1970-77?
The average annual gross rate of return on total equity appears to
have increased until 1973, declined in 1974, and then increased
again, with a value of about 29 per cent for the period 1970-77 as
a whole. We can offer no plausible reasons for this trend at this
time. The range of this rate of return, as in the case of the pre-
viously discussed gross rate of return on total assets, was quite
wide, for both each year and the eight-year period as a whole. One
firm, in Pharmaceuticals, had suffered the minimum average annual
return (loss) of -51 per cent for 1970-77, in contrast with another,
in chemicals, that achieved the maximum average annual return of
almost 84 per cent, for the same period. The Pharmaceuticals firm
was not a newly founded firm whose losses could be explained in terms
of a long investment gestation period. It had been in existence for
almost 20 years. Actually the chemicals firm was four years younger
than the Pharmaceuticals firm. We now look at the sectoral differences
in our estimates of annual average gross rates of return to see
whether they show a definite pattern.
We observe that the average annual gross rates of return for the
eight-year period as a whole in sectors 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 did
not diverge very significantly from the rate for all the sectors com-
bined. Sectors 1, 8, and 9 had above average, whereas sectors 5, 6,
and 7 had below average returns, relatively to our aggregated sample
estimate. The remaining three sectors, namely, sectors 2, 3, and 4,
however, tell a different story. Sectors 2 and 3, especially the
former, showed returns that exceeded the average by a significant
margin. Sector 4, however, had a negative rate of return, with sharp
annual fluctuations. Although sectoral patterns in this rate of re-
turn, like the others, will be studied more thoroughly in later stages
of our work, it should be noted now that the pervasive government
price controls on almost all manufactured products were among the- 108 -
important determinants of DFI firms' earnings. In fact, the phar-
maceutical firms told the author during the interviews that
whether in any given year they would have negative or positive
earnings depended very much on the levels of prices fixed by the
government for their products relative to their unit costs that
kept rising almost continuously. They complained that although
their labor and intermediate input costs kept increasing incessantly,
the government allowed them price hikes only after long and
arduous lobbying in Ankara, coupled with periodic deliberate pro-
duction slow-downs to limit their losses. This must have been yet
another reason why many DFI firms preferred to remit profits to their
parents via transfer-pricing for greater consistency and reliability.
22. What Has Been the DFI Firm's Rate of Return in Terms of Earnings
After Income Tax as a Percentage of Total Equity during 1970-77?
Not surprisingly, the average annual net rate of return on total
equity shows the time pattern of the gross rate, with a value of
about 18 per cent for the period 1970-77 as a whole. And, like the
gross rate, it has a rather wide range of variation, for both each
year and the entire eight-year period. The minimum (negative) and
maximum returns for the period 1970-77 as a whole are accounted by
the same Pharmaceuticals and chemicals firms, respectively, that
were referred to in the last section, concerning the gross rate.
Again we next focus on the sectoral rates of return, whose
differences would be expected naturally to reflect the differences
in the gross rates on total equity which have been already reviewed
in the previous section.
These sectoral differences in the net rates of return on total
equity estimates, if indeed based on accurate and representative
reporting by the DFI firms in our sample, raise several interesting













































































1970-77 29.3 25.8 5.8 -51.0 83.8 20 26
Negative rates I'opresent lossesTable 58- Sectoral Gross Rates of Return on Total Equity-Mean (1970-77)
Sectors


















































































1970-77 31.4 53.8 43.0 -10.9 25.0 26.9 23.8 32.5 33.1
1. Food and beverages 2. Rubber 3. Chemicals 4. Pharmaceuticals
5. Transportation vehicles and tractors 6. Non-electrical machinery and metal products
7. Electrical cables 8. Electrical machinery and electronocs 9, Building Materials- Ill -
relative productivity of DFI in the different sectors of Turkish
manufacturing? (2) If so, should new DFI activity be concentrated
in those sectors with relatively higher rates of return? (3) If
not, why not? i.e. what other private benefits accrue to investors,
not included in the rates of return estimates, that should be
taken into account in a complete accounting of DFI productivity?
(4) Even after all private benefits to investors have been accounted
for, are there quantifiable social (net) benefits that ought to be
considered in Turkish DFI policy-making for a better, i.e. socially
more productive allocation of new DFI? These and other interesting
but admittedly very difficult questions will be addressed in the
final stage of our work after all other aspects of DFI activity
in Turkish manufacturing have been investigated.
A. The Controversy on Legitimate Field of DFI Activity
In concluding this section, we now take up a very important issue
that has affected the profitability of DFI firms, besides being
a constant source of friction between many DFI firms and the
Turkish government. This issue concerns the legitimate fields of
activity for DFI firms. We first summarize the claims and complaints
of DFI firms and then present the responses of government officials
that were recorded in separate interviews.
According to the DFI firms, there were unreasonable official re-
strictions on the business activities open to DFI firms, contrary
to the spirit of Law 6224. The government frequently accused
DFI firms of operating in areas legally closed to them and had
their transferable profits attributable to the allegedly illegal
activities blocked at the Central Bank.
The government claimed that DFI firms covered by Law 6224 could
not engage in commercial activities. They had to limit themselves
to manufacturing proper and leave commerce to either all-TurkishTable 59 - Net Rates of Return on Total Equity
Valid Missing
Year Mean Deviation Error Minimum Maximum
1970 15.9 14.4 3.1 -9.5 65.0
1971 4.2 40.4 8.3 -143.0 37.9
1972 18.8 19.0 3.7 -39.0 51.7
1973 20.3 24.1 4.6 -78.0 55.8
1974 14.2 56.0 10.4 -257.3 87.4
1975 17.8 29.2 5.4 -116.6 64.0
1976 20.4 42.9 7.8 -166.3 116.4
1977 27.9 28.4 5.4 -3.8 114.5
1970-77 17.9 22.5 5.2 -54.5 67.7 19 27
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5. Transportation vehicles and tractors 6. Non-electrical machinery and metal products















it ^- 114 -
firms or those DFI firms covered by Decree 17 of Law 1567 (for
the Protection of the Value of Turkish Currency). The Law 6224 -
DFI firms objected first to the government's arbitrary and
discriminatory interpretation of Lav; 6224 as not permitting them
to engage in commerce, and second to its too broad classification
of their manufacturing - related activities under commerce.
Law 6224, claimed the DFI firms that it covered, contained no
provision, explicit or implicit, on commerce being off limits to
them. Any field open to Turkish private investors was to be open
to foreign investors, too, according to Article 1 - Clause b of
the law. Commerce was surely one such field.
DFI firms argued that they had been unfairly restricted by the
government to the production-end only when they had been allowed
to invest in Turkey. The sales-end had been closed to them. Con-
sequently, their profits could come only from production, i.e.
from ex-factory sales, usually at government-controlled prices
and/or profit margins that deprived them of the lucrative profits
available at the sales-end. Often the sales-end was in the hands
of an all-Turkish firm that was founded and owned by the Turkish
partners of the DFI firms. This sales or distribution firm pur-
chased the manufactured goods from the DFI firm at prices that
deliberately depressed profits at the production-end and inflated
them at the sales-end.
This arrangement naturally created a conflict of interest between
the foreign and local partners of a DFI firm. The local partners
preferred to take their profits at the sales-end, not having to
share them with the foreign partners. This arrangement also suited
government's objective of minimizing the profits of the foreign
partners for nationalistic and foreign-exchange saving reasons.
In the long run, however, the production-end was starved of
profits that were needed for increasing capacity and/or productivity- 115 -
via self-financing. In other words, both the government and
local partners were short-sighted and anti-production-oriented
in depressing profits at the production-end in order to minimize
the returns to foreigners.
Interestingly, however, the foreign partners were able to
protect their own interests in spite of the official attempts
to limit their returns, by resorting to transfer-pricing.They
argued that they were left with no choice but transfer-pricing,
although many did not refer to it as "transfer-pricing" explicitly.
They simply applied sufficiently high mark-ups to the prices
of the imported raw materials and other intermediate inputs to
make up for the deficiency in their legal transferable profits.
In most cases, these imports were directly purchased from
the parent firms.
The foreign partners had three basic reasons for resorting to
transfer-pricing for remitting some or most of their profits
abroad:
(1) As already mentioned above, the government depressed their
legal transferable profits by restricting them to the pro-
duction-end only and also controlling their product prices
and/or profit margins.
(2) The government was suspicious of and unfriendly toward
highly profitable DFI firms. Any DFI firm that earned high
legal profits on which it, of course, paid taxed to the
Turkish government, would be accused of exploiting Turkey,
and subsequently subjected to harassment. The government
would try to invent grounds on which it could block at the
Central Bank, what it regarded as "excess" profits. It would
also seek ways to limit the growth of such a firm, decrease
the foreign equity share, make other unreasonable and unfavo-
rable changes in the firm's decrees, and ultimately prevent
the firm being "too" profitable.- 116 -
(3) It was easier to remit profits abroad by transfer-pricing
than by having them transferred by the Central Bank as legal
DFI profits. The government, faced by an almost continuous
foreign-exchange shortage, gave priority to foreign-exchange
allocations for imports of intermediate inputs over those
for DFI profit remittances. Of course, the government's
Import Price Control Committee was supposed to regulate
the prices charged for such imports, but it was simply not
capable of doing an effective job. One automotive DFI
firm's foreign chief executive referred to the Committee's
regulatory function as a "farce", and claimed that its
officials were either too incompetent or too dishonest to
perform their tasks effectively.
Several of the DFI firms interviewed pointed out that they had
stopped some years ago transferring abroad any profits via the
Central Bank, and that they wished to continue relying on transfer-
pricing exclusively. They thought that the government seemed to
prefer that arrangement, for it had never questioned them as to
how they could justify their continued existence in Turkey to
their parent firms year after year, without remitting any profits
via the Central Bank.
The Turkish partners of most DFI firms were well aware of the
wide spread practice of transfer-pricing through which their
foreign partners remitted profits abroad. They seemed to accept
this as inevitable, given the official restrictions discussed
earlier. Without it, they noted, their foreign partners would
definitely pull out of Turkey.
Besides prohibiting the Law 6224 DFI firms from investing in
commerce proper, the Turkish government often tried to keep
these firms out of what it claimed to be essentially commercial
activities, but which were, in fact, directly related to the- 117 -
firms' manufacturing activities. It had the transferable
profits of the firms that it accused of engaging in essentially
commercial activities blocked at the Central Bank. Then the
firms had either to give in to the government and cease those
activities or challenge it in Danistay if they believed that
the High Turkish Court might somehow rule in their favor.
What were these activities that the government claimed to be
essentially commercial?
(1) Selling of land, buildings, transportation vehicles, and
other such fixed assets owned and previously used by the DFI
firms in their manufacturing activities. The government claimed
that the DFI firms, unlike their all-Turkish rivals, could
not sell such used fixed assets without its permission. Even
when they were permitted to do so, their transferable profits
resulting from the difference between the buying and selling
prices of such assets would be blocked at the Central Bank.
The government had imposed such restrictions in order to pre-
vent DFI firms from speculating in real estate and capital
goods. But, first, it ignored that these discriminatory
restrictions did not apply to all-Turkish firms, and, second,
it wrongly assumed that all selling of real estate and capital
goods by DFI firms had to be speculative. In many cases, such
selling involved fixed assets that the DFI firms had for many
years owned and used directly in their manufacturing activities.
After the sale of such assets, the firms often had to replace
them with others at higher prices than they had originally
paid. The government seemed not to realize that replacement
costs exceeded the historical book values.
(2) Providing systems engineering, installment, and repair
services to accompany and follow the sales of manufactured
products, especially capital goods, by the DFI firms. The- 118 -
government refused to accept that such services were di-
rectly related to manufacturing and that often they could
be provided by only the DFI firms themselves that had
produced the goods. It claimed that such services were
commercial in nature, and therefore, off limits to the
Law 6224 DFI firms. It blocked at the Central Bank, the
transferable profits derived from these services.
Several DFI firms confessed that the government's unrea-
sonable restrictions on their service activities forced them
to receive concealed payments. They added, whenever they
could, the costs of such services to the prices of the
manufactured goods. Occasionally, they received off-the-
record payments, either without any invoicing or with in-
voicing that understated the actual payments. This was
yet another instance in which DFI firms blamed the govern-
ment's unfair discriminatory restrictions, on the basis of
which, they claimed, they could not operate legally, for
their illegal ways of doing business in Turkey.
(3) Selling of scrap and other secondary - or by-products. The
government claimed that a DFI firm could sell only its
primary product(s) that it was explicitly authorized, by
its decree(s), to produce, jf the firm sold any other productSj even if it was produced by the same process used to produce
the primary product, its transferable profits were blocked
by the government. This, too, was a discriminatory restric-
tion on the activities of DFI firms that all-Turkish firms
did not face.
No invoicing and under-invoicing were prevalent in the Turkish economy
among alA firms, especially small all-Turkish ones. The main reason;
was, of course, tax evasion. Many DFI firms complained that often
they were forced into these practices by their local industrial
suppliers who evaded taxes routinely.- 119 -
Several DFI firms admitted that they avoided this restriction
by either not invoicing or under-invoicing the sales of the
products they were not supposed to sell. Thereby they either
showed no profits that could be blocked, and, cf course, taxed,
or let the government have some profits to block when such
sales x^ere too conspicuous to conceal completely.These firms
claimed that the government had forced them, with its unfair
and unreasonable restrictions, to resort to off-the-record
transactions. The local partners, too, benefited from such
concealed transactions by having their tax liabilities reduced.
DFI officials of both the State Planning Organization and the
Ministry of Commerce were categorical in their assertion that
Law 6224 did not allow DFI in commerce. According to the SPO, Turkey
needed DFI only in production, not in distribution. Turks could
themselves distribute whatever was produced. Did foreigners distri-
bute directly imported products in Turkey? Why should then they be
allowed to distribute locally manufactured products? Turkey had
no need of foreign know-how in distribution or sales for the •
domestic market. Why did DFI firms not concentrate their sales
skills on foreign markets instead and help Turkish manufacturing
become export-oriented?
The SPO claimed that most foreign investors in Turkish manufacturing
deliberately de-emphasized exports. They did not wish to spoil
their foreign markets, already supplied from their non-Turkish
sources of production, with Turkish exports. Furthermore, because
It should be noted that whenever a DFI firm was accused of operating in an
unauthorized area, the government's punitive action of blocking the relevant
transferable profits at the Central Bank was directed at the foreign
partner(s) only. The profits of the local partner(s) were let alone. In
other words, the government punished the foreign investor(s) directly,
rather than the DFI firm itself.- 120 -
of the high mark-ups they applied to their imported intermediate
inputs, which enabled them to smuggle their excess profits out
of Turkey, their units production costs in Turkey were too high
for world markets.
The Ministry of Commerce argued that it was pointless for DFI
firms to criticize their exclusion from commercial activities,
since they had decided to invest in Turkey with full knowledge
of that exclusion. It did not matter for Turkey that some other
developing countries permitted DFI firms to extend their activities
into distribution. Turkey preferred to restrict them to the pro-
duction-end only and that was that. If that restriction was too
disadvantageous for them, they would not invest in Turkey. On
the other hand, if they preferred to invest in commerce rather
than in production (but, of course, not in both), then Decree 17
of Law 1567 would govern their activities in Turkey.
Now, Law 6224 did not, in our opinion, contain any explicit re-
striction on DFI in commerce proper. But then, it also did not
mention commerce explicitly as a field of activity open to DFI.
This was just another feature of its vagueness that more than
compensated for its liberalism.
If we examine the predecessor of Law 6224, namely Law 5821, we
see that it had explicitly excluded commerce, together with agri-
culture, from fields open to DFI. Law 6224, however, dropped that
explicit exclusion and declared that DFI would be permitted in all
sectors of the economy, provided it:
Decree 17 DFI firms' transferable profits could be entirely and legally
blocked at the Central Bank, whereas Law 6224 DFI firms had, at least on
paper, the right to transfer all their (foreign-equity) profits free of
any restrictions. The former could remit their blocked profits only at
the pleasure of the government.- 121 -
(a) aided the country's economic development (not specified as
to how this was to be determined)j
(b) was active in a field that was open to private Turkish
enterprises;
(c) did not possess any monopoly or special privileges.
The DFI firms covered by Law 6224 invoked (b) to support their
claim that by law they should be allowed to extend their activities
into commerce and distribution. The government, on the o^her
hand, invoked (a) to reject their claim. It argued that DFI in
domestic commercial activities was not needed for the country's
economic development.
Clearly, the vagueness or the flexibility of Law 6224 worked in
favor of the government. Furthermore, the government had consistent-
ly stuck to its position, since the enactment of Law 6224, to
exclude DFI firms from commerce when they were founded. There-
fore, Turkey's policy of excluding DFI firms from commerce, whether
motivated by economic or political considerations, was well-
2
established and known. Of course, it was altogether a different
matter whether such an exclusion had indeed been in Turkey's own
interest.
A few smaller DFI firms, covered by Law 6224, actually had, sometime after
their establishment, extended their activities into domestic distribution
by taking over their all-Turkish distribution firms. The government had
permitted this when these DFI firms had made it clear that they would
otherwise pull out of Turkey due to inadequate returns.
2
The evolution of this policy might be better understood if it is kept in
mind that during the Ottoman Empire almost all domestic as well as foreign
commerce of Turkey was dominated by the so-called minorities, namely
the Armenians, Greeks, and Jews. After the Republic was founded in 1923,
the government put great emphasis on the turkizing of the nation's
commercial life through various means. The expulsion of the minorities
earlier, and the Wealth Tax of World War II later, were the most effective
ones.- 122 -
It should also be pointed out that as a result of Turkey's
highly protectionist strategy of industrialization, almost all
sectors in which DFI had been permitted faced sellers' markets.
Anything produced could be sold locally to buyers who could
not, at least legally, take advantage of competitive imports.
Marketing, either wholesale or retail selling, as a tool of
distributing a firm's products was far less important than it
would be in an open and developed economy. All-Turkish distri-
bution firms were able to market domestically the products of
DFI firms without difficulty, without the use of modern marketing
methods in which the foreign investors would have had a comparative,
and even absolute, advantage. In this sense at least, the govern-
ment was correct in arguing that Turkey needed no DFI in commerce.
Had Turkey pursued a less protectionist industrialization (or were
to in the future), however, DFI in commerce might have been
(or might become) almost a necessity.
Related to the above consideration is the observation that there
was a wide-spread misconception among government officials and
Turkish businessmen concerning inflow of foreign technology and
technical know-how. It was believed that only tangible technologies,
i.e. those embodied in machines to produce physical goods, were
worth paying for. Anything intangible, such as marketing know-how,
was not worth paying for via either DFI projects or licensing
agreements. This sharp distinction between "hard" and "soft" tech-
nologies, which paralleled the common belief that production was a
socially useful activity but distribution was not, might also be
a reason for Turkey's preference to keep DFI out of commerce.
In fact, there seemed to be a growing tendency among Turkish bureaucrats
and leftist political parties, including the Republican People's Party,
to reduce the role of even all-Turkish private firms in commerce by strengthe-
ning the position of State firms. This tendency was a reflection of the
belief that commerce, when performed by private interests, was a socially
parasitic activity.- 123 -
Concerning the complaint of DFI firms that the government,
specifically the Ministry of Finance, unreasonably classified
some of their activities as essentially commercial, the official
reactions varied among the SPO, the Ministry of Commerce, and
the Ministry of Finance. Surprisingly, the SPO's DFI officials
were most sympathetic. They stated that, except for speculative
land sales, the activities classified by the Ministry of Finance
as essentially commercial should not be restricted. They believed
that that ministry had been over-zealous in its regulation of
DFI firms.
The DFI officials of the Ministry of Commerce agreed with the
Ministry of Finance, except for the restriction on scrap sales.
They were adamant in opposing the provision of any kind of service
by DFI firms to,their customers, unless that was explicitly men-
tioned in their decrees. And, in principle, only all-Turkish
firms should be permitted to provide such services. If necessary,
DFI firms should aid the establishment and development of such firms.
The DFI officials of the Ministry of Finance, however, took refuge
behind the explanation that this complaint, too, had nothing to
do with them. The responsible agency was the Department of
Taxation which sent its auditors to breathe fire down the necks
of DFI firms. These officials actually sympathized with the firms.
They suggested that all DFI decrees should be made very specific
to spell out in detail the activities that the firms could carry
out without any harassment from their ministry's auditors.
Now, it remains to point out that there were several DFI firms,
covered by Law 6224, in the service sector, including tourism,
banking, consulting, and communications. Obviously, there had
been no outright exclusion of all DFI from services per se, contrary
to what might have been assumed on the basis of the foregoing
discussion. But these service-sector-DFI firms were not also- 124 -
active in manufacturing. Therefore, we can conclude that
rather than opposing DFI in services in itself, the government
had objected to a DFI firm's being active in both manufacturing
and services.
For which reasons? The only possible reason worth mentioning is
that the government might have wished to prevent any given DFI
firm from becoming too big and powerful by integrating vertically
its manufacturing and servicing activities. Such a reason appears
plausible in light of Turkey's historical as well as ideological
fear of falling under the economic and political domination of
DFI firms and the foreign interests they represented.
The reaction of all DFI government officials to the argument of
DFI firms that their transfer-pricing resulted from the unfair
and unreasonable restrictions imposed on them was uniformly
hostile. The officials rebutted that argument by claiming that
transfer-pricing was practised world-wide by multinational companies,
regardless of the differences in the DFI policies of their indi-
vidual host-countries. They believed that Turkey could, on its
own, reduce the scope of that widespread practice, not by becoming
more liberal in its DFI policies, but by regulating its DFI
firms more thoroughly and effectively.
Their reaction to other shady practices of DFI firms, such as
no-invoicing and under-invoicing, was the same. The only way to
cope with them was to create more regulations and to apply the
existing ones more effectively. They viewed the firms as their
natural adversaries and argued that the firms would always cheat
if not watched closely.- 125 -
23. How Did the Climate for DFI in Turkey Compare with the Average
Climate in Other Less Developed Countries Mien It Was
Decided to Invest in This Project?




















































1. Substantially better 2. Slightly better 3. About the same
4. Slightly worse 5. Substantially worse
Mean = 2.378
Standard Error = 0.161
Standard Deviation = 0.982
Mode =2.
More than 50 per cent of the respondents rated Turkey's initial
relative DFI climate as "better", and only about 14 per cent as
(only "slightly")"worse". The mean, 2.378, of this ordinal rating
gave Turkey an initial edge over most other less developed countries
(LDCs) in attractiveness to DFI.
How did the different sectors rate the initial DFI climate in terms
of their means, based on the ordinal scale between 1 and 5?- 126 -
Table 62 - Initial Relative DFI Climate by Sector
Sector Initial Relative DFI Climate - Mean




5. Transportation Vehicles 3.000
and Tractors
6. Non-electrical Machinery 2.000
and Metal Products
7. Electrical Cables 2.500
8. Electrical Machinery and 2.444
Electronics
9. Building Materials 2.000
It is not at all surprising that sector 4 came up with the relatively
best rating since its penetration by DFI took place in the 1950s
when Turkey appeared to pursue basically an open-door DFI policy.
Since then, however, Turkey's DFI policies have become progressively
more demanding of DFI firms. Concurrently, the country had become
relatively less stable in its economic, political and social
conditions, confronting DFI firms with greater uncertainty and
apprehension about their future.
Interestingly, however, none of the sectors rated Turkey initially
as "worse" than most other LDCs in its DFI climate. It might be
said, of course, that it would have been rather unusual for foreign
investors to admist seeing Turkey as a "worse" place to invest at
the time they had actually decided to enter Turkey. Presumably, they
could and would have gone somewhere else "better", if Turkey had
been a "worse" place. It should also be noted, however, that no
sector rated Turkey initially being close to a "substantially better"
place to invest.- 127 -
24. How Does the Climate for DFI in Turkey Compare Now with the
Average Climate in Other Less Developed Countries?




























































Almost 77 per cent of the respondents rated Turkey's present relative
DFI climate as "worse" and only about 10 per cent as "better". The
mean, 4.077, of this ordinal rating indicates that on the average
Turkey was a "slightly worse" place to invest in. But, the question
might be asked, if indeed DFI firms viewed Turkey in this light when
they participated in the present study, why did they also complain
about the government's restrictions on their expansion? The answer
is that those restrictions themselves contributed to the firms' nega-
tive rating of Turkey's current DFI climate. Furthermore, as was noted
earlier, many of the respondents viewed their difficulties as being- 128 -
temporary and hoped to ride them out in the near future. In other
words, they were pessimistic about the short-run but optimistic
about the long-run. Those foreign investors who were pessimistic
about both the short- and the long-run either had already pulled
out ofTurkey or were about to. In fact, during the two-year period
this research project was carried out only a very few new DFI firms
were established but several old ones were taken over by Turkish
nationals, reducing the. total number of active Law 6224 DFI firms
in manufacturing.
How did the different sectors rate the current DFI environment?
Was there a significant uniformity among them as in their rating
of the initial DFI climate?
Table 64 - Present Relative DFI Climate by Sector
Sector Present Relative DFI Climate - Mean




5. Transportation Vehicles 3.833
and Tractors
6. Non-electrical Machinery 2.500
and Metal Products
7. Electrical Cables 3.500
8. Electrical Machinery 4.444
and Electronics
9. Building Materials 4.000
We see that there was relatively less uniformity among the sectors.
Sector 6, for example, even gave Turkey an almost "slightly better"
rating which we cannot explain in terms of our other findings so far.
We hope to shed some light on this and several other issues not ade-
quately understood and explained within the limited framework of this
initial research report, in our forthcoming reports, especially those
focusing on individual sectors in more detail.- 129 -
VI. Closing Remarks
This working paper, first in a series of working papers that will
t-
contain the findings of a two-year study on the role DFI in Turkish
manufacturing development, focused on the DFI process itself.
In our empirical analysis of this process, several interesting
conclusions seemed to emerge. These conclusions, although of
particular interest in themselves, raised many questions that could
not yet be answered without systematic and detailed analyses of all
relevant aspects of DFI activities in Turkish manufacturing, especially
on a sectoral level. In fact, it might be said that this initial
paper has formulated or at least suggested more (yet unanswered)
questions than it has itself answered.
The task of the forthcoming papers is to tackle these unanswered
questions and also deal with other questions too specific to have
been raised in the present paper. And, most importantly, the final
purpose of our later work is to integrate the various different but
related aspects of the role of DFI in the development of Turkish'
manufacturing, to be considered separately in individual papers.
It is only then can we say to have achieved our ultimate goal in
studying DFI in Turkish manufacturing. And, also only then can we
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